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Abstract 
This paper describes institutions of direct democracy between 1997 and 2003 in 26 Swiss 
cantons (states), specifically the statutory initiative and referendum, the constitutional 
initiative, and the fiscal referendum. In particular, it discusses their applications, but also the 
legal requirements for making use of them, including the signature requirements, the time 
available for their collection, and the financial thresholds. Optional and mandatory forms of 
these direct-legislative institutions are distinguished.  
This paper also provides calculations of the index and sub-indices of direct democracy for the 
additional years 1997 to 2003, in continuation of Stutzer (1999), using the identical 
methodology. Extending Trechsel and Serdült (1999) and Stutzer (1999) this paper includes 
the political institutions of the so-called Landsgemeinde cantons. Description of these 
institutions is based on the author‟s reading of 26 cantonal constitutions in their versions 
between 1997 and 2003.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Scope of paper 
For an empirical analysis, the accuracy of data plays a decisive role. This paper tries to aid 
researchers interested in the study of direct democracy (1) by briefly introducing the 
institutions of direct legislation in all 26 Swiss cantons 1997 – 2003 and (2) by providing the 
necessary data for continuing empirical research. In particular, it describes the formal 
requirements (and changes therein) for the constitutional initiative, the statutory initiative, the 
statutory referendum, and the fiscal referendum for all 26 cantons between 1997 and 2003. 
Furthermore, this paper presents the corresponding values of the index of direct democracy 
(and its sub-indices for the single institutions). Given that the Swiss household panel, which 
constitutes the most important source of individual data in Switzerland, started in 1999, this 
period of investigation is of particular importance. Finally, the aspect of language should not 
be neglected: most of the literature on the Swiss institutions of direct democracy is still 
written in German or French (and so are the cantonal constitutions). Since there appears to be 
a void of English-speaking literature on this subject, this paper fills this gap by providing 
information on institutions of direct democracy in Swiss cantons to the Anglophone world, 
with the aim to facilitate the scientific discussions and the ongoing empirical research. Thus, 
this paper might equally serve as a bridge between local researchers and the international 
scientific community. 
 
 
1.2.  Definition of direct democracy 
'Direct democracy', or more precisely, „direct legislation‟, implies the direct influence of the 
people on the political decision-making process whose outcomes gain shape in both laws and 
decrees of the parliament. 'Direct democracy' means that a modern democracy, which takes 
place solely through representative institutions of political decision-making, is complemented 
by direct-democratic institutions. As economists, why should we care about political 
institutions such as means of direct legislation? Political decisions made in political 
(legislative and executive) organs influence economic processes and outcomes, and – 
according to political economic theory - means of direct legislation influence the political 
outcome in favor of the preferences of the citizenry (Besley and Coate, 2001; Feld and 
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Kirchgässner, 2001; Hug, 2004). The typical institutions of direct legislation are referenda and 
initiatives.  
 
Few countries in the world offer direct-legislative opportunities to their people, particularly 
the opportunity to influence the daily political decision-making processes. Basically, only two 
nations offer an extensive range of such direct-democratic means: the United States of 
America and Switzerland
1
. The political system of Switzerland is shaped by two important 
characteristics. First, in this federal country, direct legislative institutions exist on all three 
levels – i.e. the federal level, the cantonal ('state') level, and the communal level. Second, 
Switzerland shows a very strong fiscal decentralization, which, in contrast to Austria and 
Germany, gives each level in the state its own tax sources. Therefore, direct democracy 
provides an institutional link between the power to tax and the power to spend - providing 
local citizens with the political means to influence both sides of the local budget equally. 
 
From an econometric viewpoint, Switzerland can be regarded as a perfect laboratory for 
studying the impact of direct democracy on political outcomes (see also e.g. Kirchgässner, 
2002a, 2000): Switzerland provides a set of 26 cantons, of which each can be treated as one 
observation, with 26 varying degrees of direct democracy laid down in its state constitution. 
All the cantons, however, share an identical macroeconomic and political framework at a 
higher level, so that some difficulties arising in cross-national comparisons can be avoided. 
This common framework is shaped by policy-making at the federal level, international 
politics, and the economic situation of the rest of the world.  
 
 
The statutory initiative and the fiscal referendum 
In the case of Swiss cantons, particularly the statutory initiative and the fiscal referendum play 
decisive roles (see Frey and Stutzer, 2000a, 2000c; Feld et al., 2007; see the review by 
Kirchgässner, 2002b, for more fiscal aspects). Whereas the fiscal referendum is of a reactive 
nature, the statutory initiative provides citizens with an agenda-setting power. Another 
difference between these institutions is their focus: the fiscal referendum deals with 
expenditure projects of the cantonal government – i.e. it is related to administrative acts; in 
contrast, the statutory initiative directly influences the law-making process – i.e. it is either 
                                                 
1
 In many other countries, however, such as Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Ireland, Liechtenstein, a popular 
votes are held only on constitutional amendments.  
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used for proposing new laws or for revising/eliminating already existing laws
2
. Other 
important institutions of direct legislation are the constitutional initiative and the statutory 
referendum
3
.  
 
 
1.3. Theoretical context 
Some strands of economic theory suggest that in a representative system resources are wasted 
and allocations of goods and resources occur that deviate strongly from the median voter's 
position. On the one hand, overspending is caused by (a) politicians who exploit the budget 
(and implicitly the tax base) to satisfy the needs of the electorate in their local districts ('pork-
barrel legislation')
4
; (b) the forming of broad coalition governments leading to an inefficient 
expansion of budgets by the spending ministers ('budget as a common pool')
5
; or (c) logrolling 
in the political decision-making process, which brings about the financing of minority projects 
that would otherwise not have gained support from the parliamentary majority
6
. Moreover, (d) 
government administrations are headed by bureaucrats who aim at maximizing their budget 
and extracting rents, potentially leading to a preference for those expenditure projects that 
also cause a relative increase in administrative spending (e.g. through the foundation of new 
departments, etc.)
7
. Whatever the case, politico-economic theory predicts that in a purely 
representative system, expenses are undertaken that are not preferred by the median voter, 
leading possibly to an unwanted growth in budget, the provision of public goods that are not 
the first priority for, or are supplied in a way undesirable to, the median voter, or a 
deteriorating quality of the public good due to fewer means available for its provision.  
 
                                                 
2
 The constitutional initiative aims at changing, eliminating, or adding a new constitutional law. Usually, the 
requirements for this initiative are the same as those for the legislative one, so that in econometric analyses the 
impact of the two cannot be distinguished. 
3
 In some cantons, even more specialized forms of referenda exist, such as those on highway expenditure or 
international  treaties. Examples are given. 
4
 According to Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981), this leads to a preference of projects in districts of the 
winning party at the expense of those of the loosing party. See also Tullock (1959). 
5
 See Roubini and Sachs (1989), de Haan and Sturm (1997), Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), or Volkerink and 
de Haan (2001). See Feld et al. (2003) for an empirical test with Swiss data.  
6
 See also Besley and Coate (1997, 1998) on inefficiencies in representative democracies, particularly through 
allowing the politicians to pursue their own goals between elections and the activities of interest groups. In 
addition, Besley and Coate (2001) on the role of initiatives to break up bundling of projects. See also footnote 
10. 
7
 See Niskanen (1975). See also Besley and Coate (2003) for representatives aiding bureaucrats to seek rents. 
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Nevertheless, direct democratic institutions, many of their supporters argue, can serve as 
means to discipline the behavior of politicians and bureaucrats. Using a model of political 
economy, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) show that the mere existence of such institutions 
(playing the role of a 'credible threat') leads to an allocation of goods and resources that is 
closer to the median voter's preferences than otherwise
8
. Therefore, three characteristics 
should be expected in direct democracies: first, less money is wasted on undesired projects 
because voters veto them through fiscal referenda and initiatives
9
; second, governmental 
budgets should be smaller because fewer financial projects or laws triggering new expenses 
are approved by the electorate  - if voters are fiscally conservative
10
; and third, public goods 
might be provided more efficiently as bureaucrats' discretionary power is also limited
11
. In a 
more direct democratic political system smaller governmental budgets should, in turn, bring 
about lower income and/or property tax rates, thereby relaxing the individual's budget 
constraint. In addition, because of the resulting increase in individual utility, persons living in 
a system with strong direct democracy should experience a higher level of well-being than 
those living under a purely representative political regime
12
.  
 
 
1.4.  Some empirical findings 
Most of the empirical analyses for Switzerland, but equally for the United States, provide 
supportive evidence. For example, an allocation closer to the median voter's preferences 
regarding fiscal issues is observed by Pommerehne (1975, 1978) for Switzerland and 
Matsusaka (2000) for the U.S.A. A shift of policy outcomes toward the median voter position 
                                                 
8
 Deviation from the desired allocation could also be caused by the level of information asymmetry between 
politicians and citizens (Kessler, 2001), which might also be mitigated through the existence of institutions of 
direct legislation. For a discussion on the influence of interest groups, as well as why a mitigation of 
information asymmetry might take place in the Swiss political system,, see Feld and Kirchgässner (2001) and 
Kirchgässner (2000). 
9
 For theoretical arguments, see Besley and Coate (1998, 2001, 2003); see also Feld at al. (2007) for arguments 
relating to welfare expenditures and tax revenue in Swiss cantons, and its final impact on income 
redistribution.  
10
 For more theoretical arguments, see Feld and Kirchgässner (2001), and  Fischer (2008, 2005c). 
11
 See the discussion in Fischer (2005c, 2008) on student performance and educational spending in Switzerland 
and the references for the USA therein. A contrasting view on the impact of logrolling on the production of 
public goods is presented in Breton (1996). He argues that in direct democracies an inefficiently low level of 
provision might be achieved because referenda on single projects prevent gains from vote trading. A strong 
counterargument can be found in Feld and Kirchgässner (1998). 
12
 See the various papers by Frey and Stutzer (2002, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c), also discussed in Dorn et al. (2008) 
on happiness. The well-being raising effect is also discussed in analyses of suicide in Swiss cantons, e.g. 
Fischer and Rodriguez-Andrés (2008). 
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on non-budgetary issues like parental consent laws and capital punishment is detected by 
Gerber for the U.S. (1996, 1999). 
 
As regards the budget and debt lowering impacts of direct legislation, to name some of the 
most important contributions, see e.g. Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a, 2001b) for the effect on 
cantonal and local revenue, expenditures and debt; Feld and Kirchgässner (1999) for Swiss 
municipalities; Feld and Matsusaka (2003) on sub-federal expenditure; Kirchgässner and 
Hauser (2001) on cantonal expenditure for administration; Schaltegger (2001) for the impact 
on various sub-federal budget components, Fischer (2005c) on educational spending and Feld 
et al (2007) on welfare spending and tax revenue; Pommerehne (1978) for Swiss 
municipalities; Schneider and Pommerehne (1983) on expenditure growth in Swiss 
municipalities.13  Similar empirical results have been obtained for the United States, for U.S. 
states, see e.g., Matsusaka (1995), Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996), Rueben (1997), Holcombe 
(1980), and the work by Shadbegian (1999, 2000, 2003) for local districts with TELs.
14
 
Further, and possibly as a result of the budgetary impact, Feld et al. (2003) show that income 
tax and property tax rates are lower in more direct democratic Swiss cantons.
15
 In addition, 
Feld and Savioz (1997) as well as Freitag and Vatter (2000) observe that GDP per capita is 
also greater in such cantons.  
 
Yet, given the spending dampening effect of direct democracy on sub-federal budgets, how is 
the regional and local provision of public goods affected by direct legislation?
16
 The empirical 
evidence is ambiguous in that respect. For a stronger reliance on user charges, see Feld and 
Matsusaka (2000) and Matsusaka (1995)
17
; for efficiency gains in general, see Kirchgässner 
and Hauser (2001); for quality gains occurring in the provision of garbage collection service, 
see the seminal paper by Pommerehne (1983)
18
; and for composition of educational spending, 
see Fischer (2005c); for income redistribution, see Feld et al. (2007). A detrimental impact on 
                                                 
13
 An (incomplete but informative) overview can be found in Feld and Kirchgässner (2000). For evidence on the 
fiscal conservatism of voters in the U.S., see Peltzman (1992). For contrasting empirical evidence, see 
Matsusaka (2000).  
14
 See also an overview in Kirchgässner et al. (1999). 
15
 In addition, the studies conducted by Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996, 1989) reveal also a lower 
level of tax evasion (see next section for discussion). A decentralizing impact of direct democracy on tax 
revenue, income, and property tax revenues in particular, was detected in Schaltegger and Feld (2001), i.e. in 
direct democratic cantons tax collection occurs more at the local level.  
16
 Lower spending alone is not a valid indicator of efficiency gains; it might be caused by inefficiencies through 
insufficient vote trading in the political decision-making process (see Breton, 1996).  
17
 See also Pommerehne (1978, 1983) and Feld and Matsusaka (2000). 
18
 In addition, Pommerehne (1983) reveals that institutions of direct democracy decrease the costs of garbage 
collection in Swiss municipalities. 
 7 
health (infant mortality rate) and equally educational outcomes (share of pupils with maturité 
/ Matura) is found by Barankay (2002), while a deleterious budgetary effect which transmits 
into lower student performance in Mathematics and Reading is detected by Fischer (2005b, 
2008).  
 
The works by Frey and Stutzer (2000a, 2002) support the utility increasing aspect of direct 
democracy (see also Dorn et al., 2008; see Bjørnskov et al., 2008, for an international 
perspective; see Stutzer and Frey, 2003, for a focus on procedural utility). Similarly, 
significantly less tax evasion occurs than in more representative systems, as the studies by 
Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne suggest (1989, 1996)
 19
, possibly indicating a higher 
satisfaction of tax payers with the policy-making carried out by their governments and 
administrations. Thus, the analysis of the influences of direct democracy in political processes 
and outcomes remains an important and interesting research area. 
 
 
1.5.  Structure of paper 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes briefly and very 
generally the main institutions of direct democracy in Switzerland, its various forms and 
requirements. Sections 3 to 6 form the core part of this paper, providing an overview of the 
changes in the cantonal constitutions from 1997 to 2003. Each section separately examines 
the institutional changes for one relevant direct democratic institution and describes its actual 
provisions. Addressed by section 3 the initiative (constitutional and statutory), the mandatory 
and the optional statutory referendum by section 4, and, finally, the mandatory and the 
optional fiscal referendum in section 5.  
The outcome of this research is organized in the form of tables by type of institution, intended 
to serve as a 'manual' for information on the relevant constitutional requirements and for 
further consultation. These tables also allow construction of further controls of direct 
democratic institutions, such as the signature or the financial threshold requirements for 
various time points between 1997 and 2003. Finally, the implications of these changes for the 
construction of the index are discussed in section 6 and the changes of the index are described 
in section 7. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of some aspects of the index with 
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 See also more recent analyses by Feld and Frey (2001, 2002).  
 8 
section 8. Values of the index and sub-indices for 1997 – 2003 are presented in the end of this 
paper.  
 
 
2 Introduction to institutions of direct democracy in Swiss cantons 
 
In general, institutions of direct democracy are initiatives and referenda that are usually 
regulated in constitutional stipulations. This section contains a brief introduction to these 
instruments of direct democracy and a description of the so-called „index of direct democracy‟ 
that measures the strength of these institutions at the cantonal level in Switzerland.  
 
 
2.1. The initiative 
The people‟s initiatives constitute an element of active electoral participation in the political 
decision-making process. They allow the electorate to place a proposal for a law or 
constitutional amendment on the political agenda. The requirement for a successful launch of 
any initiative is that a specific number of signatures is collected from among the electorate 
during a certain period of time. It is not uncommon for the signature requirement to increase 
proportionally to the importance of the legislative act to which the initiative pertains (e.g. law, 
partial revision of constitution, total revision of constitution).  
  
Accordingly, we speak of a statutory initiative for altering laws and a constitutional initiative 
for a constitutional amendment. In Switzerland, any proposed revision of the cantonal 
constitution must be approved by the electorate, i.e. any successfully launched constitutional 
initiative directly brings about a popular vote, as stipulated in the national constitution (art. 
51, l Swiss Federal Constitution (SC)). In contrast, a people‟s initiative that proposes a 
cantonal law (or changes thereof) is subject to a popular vote only if the cantonal parliament 
rejects the initiative or makes a counterproposal (hereby rejecting the initiative); only in some 
cantons does a popular vote generally follow a successfully launched initiative (i.e. without a 
government rejection/counterproposal). Non-rejection of (= agreement to) the people‟s 
initiative by the cantonal government constitutes an act of legislating. In any case, the new 
law may then be challenged through a mandatory or optional statutory referendum, depending 
on the state constitution. 
 9 
 
2.2. The referendum: mandatory or optional, ordinary or extraordinary 
Referenda (Referendums), on the other hand, constitute a reactive element of direct legislation 
because they can only take the form of a reaction to preceding activities of the legislative 
body, putting government decisions on the ballot. Like an initiative, a referendum is usually 
triggered by collecting a certain number of signatures within a specific time window after 
(publication of the) the government decision.  
 
Referenda at the cantonal level are, in general, applicable to laws, decrees, international and 
intercantonal treaties (concordats), and fiscal issues such as expenditure projects. 
Accordingly, we speak of a so-called statutory referendum for laws (Gesetzesreferendum), an 
administrative referendum for decrees (as they constitute an administrative act –  
Verwaltungsreferendum), a referendum for treaties (Staatsvertragsreferendum), and the fiscal 
referendum (Finanzreferendum). In theory, all referenda could exist in either a mandatory or 
an optional form: a mandatory referendum triggers a popular vote automatically following a 
decision by the representative body, whereas an optional referendum must be held only if 
some specific requirements have been met by the electorate – usually a signature 
requirement
20
. In theory, all referenda can also exist in an ordinary or extraordinary form. If a 
referendum is ordinary, its (potential) application is directly stipulated in the cantonal 
constitution; it is, in a sense, part of the daily political decision-making process. An 
extraordinary referendum, however, can only be held if a minority of the representative organ 
members of the canton demands it: in this case, the requirements of this extraordinary 
optional referendum are stipulated in the legal act to which it refers. In general, not all types 
of referenda exist in one canton, and there is a huge variation in requirements between them.  
 
 
2.3. The minimum of direct-legislative institutions  
To ensure a minimum level of direct democracy in each Swiss canton, the federal constitution 
rules which institutions of direct legislation must exist at the cantonal level. Article 51, 1 SC 
states that 'each canton shall stipulate a democratic constitution', where 'democratic ' refers to 
the organization of the canton, particularly the division of power, and to the fact that the 
cantonal parliament is elected by the cantonal citizenry (Ehrenzeller et al. 2002, p. 624, no. 8). 
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 In case of fiscal referenda, both forms require the meeting of a financial threshold in first place. 
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As regards institutions of direct legislation, as already mentioned above
21
, only the 
constitutional referendum and the constitutional initiative (both for a partial and total revision 
of the constitution) are required in addition by art. 51, 1 SC (Ehrenzeller et al., 2002, p. 624, 
no. 9). Although at the federal level a statutory referendum for federal laws is stipulated in its 
optional form (art. 141 SC), this institution is not prescribed for the 26 Swiss cantons. 
Nevertheless, all Swiss cantons guarantee their citizens more direct democratic rights than the 
required minimum. In fact, the statutory referendum of direct legislation exists in all 26 Swiss 
cantons, as do most of the other institutions such as the fiscal referendum and the 
administrative referendum
22
. In addition, changes in cantonal territory are subject to approval 
through a popular vote of the affected populations and cantons (art. 53, 3 SC), as are 
secessions or unifications of cantons (art. 53, 2 SC).  
 
 
2.4. The index of direct democracy and scope of this paper 
As regards the institutions of direct democracy to be analyzed in this paper, they are restricted 
mainly to those that serve as a basis for constructing the so-called index of direct democracy 
as developed by Stutzer (1999). This index is an unweighted average of four sub-indices that 
measure the strength of four specific institutions of direct legislation; in particular, the 
initiatives for constitutional and statutory changes, the fiscal referendum (ordinary optional 
and mandatory) on expenditure projects, and the (ordinary optional and mandatory) 
referendum for laws (and decrees)
23
. To follow this paper‟s development more easily, the 
reader should recall that these sub-indices are based on an evaluation of the requirements for 
each institution: on the one hand, the signature requirements (number, time) necessary for 
optional referenda and initiatives, and, on the other, the financial threshold for the (optional 
and mandatory) fiscal referenda. In order to provide as complete a picture of constitutional 
changes in institutions of direct democracy as possible, however, the discussion also lists most 
of the changes in administrative referenda and any extraordinary referenda. The 
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 Changes in the cantonal constitutions must be in accordance with the federal law that is ensured by the 
approval by the federal assembly (art. 51, 2 SC; art. 172, 2 SC). The federal assembly consists of two 
chambers: the federal parliament (Nationalrat) and the representatives of the 26 cantons (Ständerat) (art. 148, 
2 SC). In general, any cantonal stipulation should not contradict federal law (federal law breaks cantonal law, 
art. 49, 1 SC).  
22
 For an overview of the (non)existence of the most important institutions of direct legislation in Swiss cantons, 
see Lutz and Strohmann (1998).  
23
 In many cantons, the requirements for the statutory and administrative referendum are identical. However, in 
some cantons they differ, and Stutzer (1999) used either their average or either one of them to construct the 
sub-index of the statutory referendum.  
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administrative referenda are listed in the section on statutory referenda, because with respect 
to their political intention, they are closely related to the statutory referendum. 
 
The original values of the index of direct democracy were calculated by Stutzer (1999) for the 
years 1970, 1992, and 1996 and were then updated for the missing years between 1980 and 
1998 by Feld and Schaltegger (see their articles in the list of references). The relevant 
information on institutions of direct democracy for its construction up to 1996
24
 can be found 
in Trechsel and Serdült (1999) (hereafter cited as T/S), in which the authors analyze the 
changes of these institutions from 1970 onwards (T/S 1999, p. 8). The index of direct 
democracy has since then been employed in various time-series cross-sectional analyses of 
the impact of direct democracy in Switzerland and is thus essential
25
. It should also be noted 
that neither Trechsel and Serdült (1999) nor Stutzer (1999) describe the political institutions 
of the so-called Landsgemeinde cantons, i.e. those cantons that knew no form of legislative 
representation or delegation by 1996 but voted on everything in an open meeting
26
. These 
Landsgemeinde cantons were Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR), 
Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW), and Glarus (GL) (see T/S 1999, p. 7
27
). This paper also 
includes a description of these cantons. 
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 Sporadically, the description of the changes reaches 1998, particularly in the second part in Trechsel and 
Serdült (1999)  which focuses on single cantonal constitutions.   
25
 E.g., see the literature cited in Kirchgässner (2002a, 2002b, 2001, 2000). 
26
 In various papers by Stutzer and Frey (e.g. 2000) index values for the Landsgemeinde cantons are also 
reported, without, however, a detailed description of their relevant constitutional stipulations.  
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 Today (2003), 2 cantons (Glarus (GL) and Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI)) are still Landsgemeinden; Nidwalden 
(NW) ceased before 1996, Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR) in 1997, and Obwalden (OW) in 1998.  
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2 .6. Constitutional changes between 1997 and 2003 
The time span between 1997 and 2003 appears to have been a period favoring the adoption of 
new cantonal constitutions. Table 1 displays a list of all 26 cantons and their constitutional 
changes that affect those direct democratic institutions on which the index of direct 
democracy is based (state: 18th Aug 2004). The cantons Freiburg (FR), Schaffhausen (SH),  
St .Gallen (SG), Graubünden (GR), Tessin (TI), Waadt (VD), and Neuenburg (NE) – about 
one fourth of all Swiss cantons – all passed new, totally revised constitutions between 1997 
and 2004 (the canton of Luzern (LU) is also currently drafting a new constitution, which 
should be voted upon in 2007
28
). The reason for this 'clustering' could lie both in a "Year 
2000" effect combined with a "200-years jubilee" effect of membership in the Swiss 
federation, which emerged from a confederation of single independent states. However, not 
all of these new constitutions necessarily brought about alterations in the existing direct 
democratic institutions: some of the new constitutions aimed primarily at rewriting the 
outdated nineteenth-century wording and giving it a more modern and accessible structure 
without altering its legal content. The rest of this section is devoted to an assessment of how 
these amendments affect the strength of direct democratic rights.  
 
As regards the statutory referendum, in several cantons a shift of the political power from the 
electorate toward the cantonal parliament occurred, resulting in a weakening of direct 
democratic institutions. Quite often, the application of the mandatory statutory referendum 
has been restricted by the inclusion of a constitutional majority requirement of the cantonal 
parliament (Solothurn (SO), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR), Graubünden (GR), Schaffhausen 
(SH)) or by restriction of the issues subject to legal stipulation (Glarus (GL))
29
.  
 
                                                 
28
 This paper was originally written in 2003. Constitutional changes after 2003 are not taken into account. See 
www.neueverfassung.lu.ch (07.10.2004) and personal communication with Mr. Zemp (20 Apr, 2005).  
29
 In case the majority restriction serves only as a means for disciplining the cantonal parliament, the introduction 
of such a majority restriction has to be regarded as equivalent to a de facto elimination of the mandatory 
referendum. Only observation of the daily political usage over a longer period of time can provide a basis for a 
correct evaluation of this new institution.  
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Table 1: Changes of the institutions of direct democracy 1997 – 2003 
Canton 
Institutional Changes  
between 1997 and 2003 
Comments 
Index 
(1996) 
Index 
(2003) 
     
ZH GRR*: 1 Jan 1999,  
FRR*: 1 Jan 1999 
 
4.417 3.500 
BE   3.020 3.021 
LU   4.420 4.417 
UR VIR, GIR, GRR: 1 Oct 1997 
FRR: 1 Oct 1997 
 
 
5.290 5.125 
SZ   4.990 4.927 
OW GIR, GRR*: 29 Nov 1998 
FRR*: 8 June 1997,  
29 Nov 1998 
Abolishment of Landsgemeinde 
(29 Nov 1998)  4.625 
NW    4.438 
GL GRR*: 5 May 2002 
FRR: 5 May 2002 
Landsgemeinde 
 5.500 
ZG   4.420 4.479 
FR  New constitution by 1 Jan 2005 2.850 2.792 
SO GRR*: 11 Dec 1998  
FRR: 11 Dec 1998 
 
5.670 5.250 
BS FRR: 1 Jan 1998 Change in cantonal law 4.400 4.396 
BL GRR*: 1 Jan 2000  5.690 5.479 
SH GRR*: 1 Jan 2003 
FRR: 1 Jan 2003 
New constitution by 1 Jan 2003 
5.210 5.021 
AR GRR*: 1 June 2000 
 
Abolishment of the 
Landsgemeinde (28 Sept 1997) 
 4.917 
AI FRR: 28 Apr 2002  Landsgemeinde   5.438 
SG VIR, GIR: 1 Jan 2003 
GRR: 1 Jan 2003 
FRR: 1 Jan 2003 
New constitution by 1 Jan 2003 
Einheitsinitiative 3.580 3.521 
GR  New constitution by 1 Jan 2004 4.750 4.833 
AG GRR*: 1 Jan 2003 
FRR: 1 Jan 2003 
 
5.460 5.438 
TG   4.330 4.333 
TI GRR: 1 Jan 1998 
FRR: 1 Jan 1998  
New constitution by 1. Jan1998 
2.100 2.250 
VD VIR, GIR: 1 Sept 2003 
FRR*: 1 Sept 2003,  
29 Nov 1998 
New constitution by 1 Sept 2003 
2.420 2.417 
VS   3.580 3.583 
NE GRR: 1 Jan 2002,  
FRR*: 1 Jan 2002 
New constitution by 1 Jan 2002 
2.190 2.729 
GE   1.750 1.750 
JU   4.020 3.708 
Notes. Empty cells indicate that no relevant revision of the constitution or relevant cantonal law had been 
observed
30
. FRR: Fiscal Referendum, GIR: Statutory Initiative, GRR: Statutory Referendum (laws), VIR: 
Constitutional Initiative. *indicates abrogation or restriction of a mandatory referendum. The dates are dates of 
effectiveness. The index values of 1996 are taken from Stutzer (1999). 
                                                 
30
 The constitutions and their tracked changes are based on the versions as of the 18th of Aug, 2004. Updated 
cantonal constitutions can be obtained from http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/13.html#131.  
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A complete abolishment of the mandatory statutory referendum has happened in four cantons 
(Zürich (ZH), Obwalden (OW), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR), Graubünden (GR)); in these 
cantons it has been replaced by an optional statutory referendum. In general, such changes 
lead to a decline in the index of direct democracy. 
 
Looking at the development of the statutory initiative and the constitutional initiative, three 
interesting changes should be noted. First, more and more cantons present these two existing 
types of initiatives jointly under the identical heading („initiative‟) in their constitution, in 
order to group them together and indicate them as two possible variations of a people's 
initiative. This technical integration is particularly true for most of the new constitutions, and 
is part of a trend to make constitutions more transparent to the average citizen. In contrast, in 
the old constitutions, the organization of the people's rights was subject to a strict juristic way 
of thinking that reflected the organization of the state as understood in the nineteenth century. 
Traditionally, stipulations regarding revisions of the state constitution (including revisions 
initiated by the people) were given a separate paper in the back part of the constitution, 
signaling hat revising the constitution was considered as being outside the daily law-making 
process (framed by the existing constitution). The statutory initiative, in contrast, was placed 
in the middle in the constitution, signaling its link to the legislative process. For this reason, 
integrating both types of (statutory and constitutional) initiatives under one heading 
constitutes not only a formal change but indicates a change in the underlying philosophy and 
understanding of the purpose of a constitution. 
 
Linked to this change is a second most recent phenomenon: the introduction of the so-called 
unitary initiative (Einheitsinitiative) (e.g. in St. Gallen (SG)) art. 43 of the new constitution), 
which also aims to make it easier for the citizens to influence the legislative process. The 
unitary initiative is a binding motion of the electorate for which no specific legal form is 
required. During the readings (Lesungen) for the new cantonal constitution in St. Gallen, the 
introduction of the Einheitsinitiative was under hot debate and the most important aspects of 
this institution were discussed (Protocol 2000b, Protocol 2000a). According to the various 
speakers, this new type of initiative offers two advantages to its citizens: first, it is said to be 
relatively easy to carry out and, second, it is the legislative organ and not the initiator who 
decides whether a change in cantonal law or in cantonal constitution is the appropriate 
(re)action. This latter means that unitary initiatives can no longer be turned down on the 
formal ground that the wrong level of law-making had been chosen by the initiators, e.g. the 
proposal of a change in cantonal law when an amendment of the constitution would have been 
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correct, and vice versa. Additionally, the Einheitsinitiative allows the development of the 
cantonal law and the constitution in a juristically consistent and systematic way. 
 
Nevertheless, the Einheitsinitiative should not be seen as a perfect substitute for the traditional 
initiatives. Both (traditional) statutory and constitutional initiatives are viewed as stronger 
instruments because the legal level of application and the content of the change are precisely 
specified. In addition, depending on the cantonal constitution, the Einheitsinitiative may serve 
as a mere suggestion of the electorate, and the cantonal parliament can decide whether to 
follow it or not: only if the parliament decides against it, a legislating referendum must be 
held. If it decides in favor and passes a cantonal law, no popular vote is needed, albeit this law 
may then be subject to the optional statutory referendum.
31
 Overall, some speakers in the 
cantonal parliament of St. Gallen pointed out, a hierarchy of types of initiatives can be 
construed in which the unitary initiative is at the lowest level of influence. Because of this 
hierarchy of initiatives, differences in the signature requirements appear justified, with the 
lowest number for the weakest instrument of direct legislation. There are, however, cantonal 
constitutions in which no differentiation is made between the number of signatures required 
for the unitary versus the statutory initiative
32
.  
 
The third phenomenon linked to the new treatment of the statutory and the constitutional 
initiatives is that more and more cantons tend to regulate the time period for collecting 
signatures in the constitution itself and not in a cantonal (by-)law (usually a law on political 
rights of its citizenry). The advantage of this development could be increased transparency 
because now all requirements concerning one institution are laid down in the same legal act. 
Another advantage might be that any change in constitution must be approved by the 
electorate through a mandatory referendum
33
, whereas an alteration of a simple cantonal law 
might only be subject to an optional statutory referendum, depending on the cantonal 
constitution. In this latter situation, political economic theory predicts larger deviations from 
the median voter‟s preferences than in the former (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2001). On the other 
hand, again depending on whether differences exist regarding the signature requirements for a 
statutory or constitutional initiative, it might have equally become more difficult for the 
                                                 
31
 However, if a constitutional amendment is chosen, the cantonal people must have the final say in a popular 
vote, as stipulated in the federal constitution. 
32
 Because of its potentially low level of political influence and because it only complements the existing 
traditional initiatives, the Einheitsinitiative does not (yet) form part of the index of direct democracy. Only the 
future will show how important the institution becomes to the daily political process and whether it should be 
included in the index construction or not. 
33
 As required by the Swiss federal constitution, see previous section. 
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electorate to change that requirement to its favor if regulated in a constitution. In political 
practice, however, between 1980 and 1998, time periods for signature collection, whether 
regulated by a law or the constitution, were rarely changed. Additionally, for all cantons 
during our investigation period, regulation at a new, higher level of lawmaking failed to bring 
about a different (shorter) time period for signature collection
34
.  
 
Table 1 provides information on how the index of direct democracy changed between 1996 
(as found in Stutzer, 1999) and 2003 (based on own calculations). It must be noted that not all 
institutional changes automatically cause a change in its total index-value: index points are 
awarded for each institution based on ranges of signature requirements or financial thresholds 
so that relatively small alterations in the requirements do not necessarily translate into a 
change in category. In addition, the reader should keep in mind that each institution influences 
the composite index by only 25%: e.g. the change in signature requirement in Basel-Land 
(BL) for the optional statutory referendum caused a total change of just about 0.21 index 
points. At this point, I would like to emphasize that because the index is constructed on a 
yearly basis, revisions of the cantonal constitution becoming effective after April 1st are 
always counted as changes in the index of the subsequent year. Moreover, it is also possible 
that several, contrasting institutional changes – either occurring simultaneously or subsequent 
to each other – might cause a compensating impact. For example, in the canton Uri (UR), a 
partial revision of the statutory and constitutional initiative and the fiscal referendum lead, 
overall, to no considerable change in the total value. Finally, it should be noted that small 
alterations in the index can be caused by changes in the residential population or the 
electorate, as some requirements enter the sub-index in the form of per capita values. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 A similar situation can be found in St. Gallen (SG) where the expenditure thresholds for the mandatory and the 
optional fiscal referendum are laid down in a cantonal law but not in the constitution.  
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3 The initiative 
 
3.1 The constitutional initiative 
 
 
Table 2: The constitutional initiative 1997 - 2003 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Articles in cant. 
constitution 
Effective since 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Zürich 
(30 Mar 2004)  
10 000 art. 29, 3 num.1 11 June 1969 
(1 June 1969) 
6 months 
art. 13, 2 
Initiativgesetz 
(art. 126 GPR) 
Bern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
30 000 (TR) 
15 000 (PR) 
art. 58, 1 lit. a 
art. 58, 2 
1 Jan 1995 6 months 
see also T/S 1999, 
p.190 
Luzern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
5 000 art. 32, 1 
art. 35 bis, 2 
1 Jan 1994 
(28 Nov 1993) 
1 Sept 1970 
(7 June 1970) 
1 year 
art. 136 lit. a SRG 
See T/S 1999, p.265  
Uri 
(1 Apr 2003) 
600 art. 27, 1 
art. 28, 2 
1 Oct 1997 
(8 June 1997) 
None 
Uri 
(old) 
300 art. 27, 1 
art. 28, 2 
(since 1985) None 
See T/S 1999, p.362 
Schwyz 
(18 Aug 2004) 
2 000  art. 102, lit. a 
art. 103, lit. b 
21 Dec 1899 
(23 Oct 1898) 
 
 
None 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.307 
Obwalden 
(22. Oct 2002) 
 
500 art. 61, 1 lit. a 
(until Nov 1998: 
art. 63 num. 1) 
19 May 1968 
 
None 
(29 Nov 1998  
(29 Nov 1998): 
abolishment of the 
Landsgemeinde) 
changes in 1998 do 
not affect institution 
Nidwalden 
(28 Dec 2001) 
1 000 (TR) 
500 (PR) 
 
art. 54, 4, num. 1 
art. 54, 4, num. 2 
(Art 54a Abs.4) 
1 Dec 1996 
(1 Dec 1996) 
 
2 months 
 
Glarus 
(30 Mar 2004) 
1 art. 138, 3 1 May 1988 
(1 May 1988) 
None 
Landsgemeinde 
Zug 
(1 Apr 2003) 
2 000 art. 79, 2 
art. 35, 1 
2 Dec 1990 
(2 Dec 1990) 
None 
(rules for the statutory 
initiative apply) 
See T/S 1999, p.397 
Freiburg 
(18 Aug 2004) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2005 
6 000 art. 41 a 
art. 42, 2 
1 Jan 2005 
(16 May 2004) 
90 days 
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Table 2: The constitutional initiative 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Articles in cant. 
constitution 
Effective since 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Freiburg 
(old) 
6 000 art. 78, 2 lit. b 3 Aug 1979 
(24 Sept 1978) 
90 days 
art. 115, 2 PRG 
art. 193, 3 PRG (old) 
see also T/S 1999, p. 
214 
Solothurn 
(30 Mar 2004) 
3 000 art. 29, I lit. a;  
art. 30, 3 
1 Jan 1988 
(8 June 1986) 
18 months 
Basel-Stadt 
(4 July 2000) 
4 000 art. 28, 1 3 June 1991 
(2 June 1991) 
None 
See T/S 1999, p.166 
Basel-Land 
(22 Oct 2002) 
1 500 art. 28, 1 1 Jan 1987 
(4 Nov 1984) 
None 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.144 
Schaffhausen 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new constitution 
by 1st Jan 2003 
1 000 art. 27, 1 lit. a 1  Jan 2003 
(22 Sept 2002) 
None 
Schaffhausen 
(old) 
1 000 art. 108 (TR) 
art. 107 (PR) 
art. 43, 2 
 
6 Apr 1997 
(6 Apr 1997) 
1. June 1876 
(14 May 1976) 
20 May 1973 
(29 Jan 1973) 
 
None 
Change of 1997 
concerns only TR and 
does not affect the 
VIR-index 
See T/S 1999, p.290 
Appenzell AR 
(3 Apr 2001) 
300 art. 51 1 May 1996 
(30 Apr 1995) 
None 
Appenzell IR 
(30 Mar 2004) 
1 art.7 bis  
art. 48  
25 Apr 1982 
(25 Apr 1982) 
Landsgemeinde 
St. Gallen 
(9  July 2002) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2003 
8 000  
 
 
 
art. 41, 1 lit. a, b 
art. 45 
 
 
1 Jan 2003 
(10 June 2001) 
5 months 
 
 
 
St. Gallen 
(old) 
 
8 000 art. 114 num. 2 
art. 115  
1926 
see T/S 1999, p. 
333 
6 months 
Graubünden 
(6 July 2004) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2004 
4 000 art. 12, 1 1 Jan 2004 
(18 May 2003 /  
14 Sept 2003) 
1 year 
art. 53c, 1 GPR 
Graubünden 
(old) 
5 000 
 
art.54, 3 2  Mar 1980 
(2 Mar 1980) 
1 year 
art. 53c, 1 GPR 
Aargau 
(30 Mar 2004) 
3 000 art.64, 1 1 Jan 1982 
(28 Sept 1980) 
1 year 
art. 54, 1 GPR 
 
Thurgau 
(22 Oct 2002) 
4 000 art.26 1 Jan 1990 
(4 Dec 1988) 
6 months 
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Table 2: The constitutional initiative 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
Requirement 
Articles in cant. 
constitution. 
Effective since 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Tessin 
(30 Mar 1999) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 1998 
10 000 art. 83 
(art. 119, 2 
LEDP) 
1 Jan 1998 
(14 Dec 1997) 
60 days 
art. 119, 1 LEDP 
Tessin 
(old) 
10 000  art. 54, 1 lit. c 
art. 56 
1970 
(31 May 1970) 
60 days 
art. 3 LIRR 
see T/S 1999, p.342 
Waadt 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new constitution 
by 1 Sept 2003 
12 000 (PR) 
18 000 (TR) 
art. 78 lit. a 
art. 79, 2 
1 Sept 2003 
(22 Sept 2002) 
4 months 
(contradicts LEDP, 
art. 92, 1) 
Waadt 
(old) 
12 000  art. 100 1961 
(11 June 1961) 
see T/S 1999, 
p.373 
3 months  
art. 92, 1 LEDP 
Wallis 
(21 Oct 2003) 
6 000  art. 100, 1 1  June 1994 
(24 Oct 1993) 
None 
Neuenburg 
(16 Oct 2001) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2002 
10 000 (TR) 
6 000 (PR) 
art. 101, 1 
art. 102, 1 
1 Jan 2002 
(24 Sept 2000) 
6 months 
art. 105, 1 LDP 
 
Neuenburg 
(old)  
 
10 000 (TR) 
6 000 (PR) 
art. 83, 1 
art.84, 1 and 2  
1959 
see T/S 1999, 
p.275 
6 months 
art. 105, 1 LDP 
Genf 
(21 Oct 2003) 
10 000 art.64  
art. 65 A 
 
 
(7 Mar 1993) 
4 months  
art. 89, 1 c LEDP 
 
Jura 
(4 July 2000) 
2 000 art.75, 1 1 Jan 1979 
(20 Mar 1977) 
12 months 
Art 89, 1 LDP 
In the column „Canton‟, the date of the version of the cantonal constitution (or the date of the download, the 18th 
of Aug, 2004) is displayed in brackets. In case of Freiburg (FR) the source was 
http://www.fr.ch/constituante/doc/fichiers/proj_def/proj.pdf (18 Aug 2004). TR denotes „total revision‟ and PR 
„partial revision‟ of the cantonal constitution; if not otherwise indicated, the signature requirement applies to both 
initiatives equally. Signature requirements relate to the corresponding cantonal electorate. The Einheitsinitiative, 
which does not enter the index of direct democracy, has been excluded. In the column „Effective since‟ the date 
of the popular vote is given in brackets. For an explanation of the abbreviation of the cantonal laws on political 
rights and their dates of enactment, see Table A.1 in the Appendix  
 
 
 20 
3.2 The statutory initiative 
 
 
Table 3: The statutory initiative 1997 - 2003 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Articles in cant. 
constitution 
Effective since 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Zürich  
(30 Mar 2004) 
10 000 art. 29, 3 num. 1 11 June 1969 
(1 June 1969) 
6 months 
see constitutional 
initiative 
Bern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
15 000  art. 58, 1 lit. b 
art. 58, 2 
1 Jan 1995 6 months 
see also T/S 1999, p. 
191 
Bern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
4 000 art.41 bis, 1 1 Sept 1970 
(7 June 1970) 
1 year 
art. 136 lit. a SRG 
 
Uri 
(1 Apr 2003) 
600 art. 27, 1 
art. 28, 2 
1 Oct 1997 
(8 June 1997) 
None 
Uri 
(old) 
300 art. 27, 1 
art. 28, 2 
(since 1985) None 
See T/S 1999, p.362 
Schwyz 
(18 Aug 2004) 
 
2 000 art. 31, 2 21 Dec 1899 
(23 Oct 1898) 
None 
See T/S 1999, p.308 
Obwalden 
(22 Oct 2002) 
 
500 art. 61, 1, lit. b 29 Nov 1998 
(29 Nov 1998) 
None 
Nov 1998: 
abolishment of the 
Landsgemeinde 
Obwalden 
(8 June 1997) 
1 art. 63, num. 2 19 May 1968 None 
Nidwalden 
(28 Dec 2001) 
250 art. 54, 4, num. 3 
art. 54, 5 
1 Dec 1996 
(1 Dec 1996) 
 
2 months 
Glarus 1 art. 69, 1;  
art. 58, 1 
5 May 2002 
(5 May 2002) 
None 
Landsgemeinde 
Only important 
regulation in form of 
law 
Glarus 
(old) 
1 art. 69, 1 lit. b; 
art. 58, 1  
1. May 1988 
(1 May 1988) 
None 
Landsgemeinde 
Zug 
(1 Apr 2003) 
2 000 art. 35, 2 2 Dec 1990 
(2 Dec 1990) 
None 
See T/S 1999, p.397 
Freiburg 
(18 Aug 2004) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2005 
6 000 art. 41 lit. b 
art. 42, 2 
1 Jan 2005 
(16 May 2004) 
90 days 
Freiburg 
(old) 
6 000 art. 28 ter,  
art. 28 quater 
11 Mar 1921 
(30 Jan 1921) 
 
90 days 
art. 115, 2  PRG 
art. 193, 3 PRG (old) 
see also T/S 1999, 
p.215 
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Table 3: The statutory initiative 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
Requirement 
Articles in cant. 
constitution 
Effective since 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Solothurn 
(30 Mar 2004) 
3 000 art. 29, 1 lit. b;  
art. 30, 3 
1 Jan 1988 
(8 June 1986) 
18 months 
Basel-Stadt 
(4 July 2000) 
4 000 art. 28, 1 3 June 1991 
(2 June 1991) 
None 
Basel-Land 
(22 Oct 2002) 
1 500 art.28, 1 1 Jan 1987 
(4 Nov 1984) 
None 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.145 
Schaffhausen 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new constitution 
by 1st Jan 2003 
1 000 art. 27, lit. b 1 Jan 2003 
(22 Sept 2002) 
None 
 
 
Schaffhausen 
(old) 
1 000 art. 43, 2 20 May 1973 
(29 Jan 1973) 
None 
 
Appenzell AR 
(1 Apr 2001) 
300 art.51 1. May 1996 
(30 Apr 1995) 
None 
Appenzell IR 
(30 Mar 2004) 
1 art.7 bis   25 Apr 1982 
(25 Apr 1982) 
Landsgemeinde 
St. Gallen 
(9 July 2002) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2003 
6 000  
 
 
(4 000) 
art. 42 
art. 45 
 
(art. 43) 
1 Jan 2003 
(10 June 2001) 
5 months 
 
 
(Einheitsinitiative) 
St. Gallen 
(old) 
4 000  
 
art. 49  1926 
see T/S 1999, 
p.334 
11 Apr 1996 
(RIG) 
3 months  
RIG art 41, 1 
Graubünden 
(6 July 2004) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2004 
 
3 000 art. 12, 2 1 Jan 2004 
(18 May 2004,  
14 Sept 2003) 
1 year 
art. 53c, 1 GPR 
Graubünden 
(old) 
3 000 art. 3, 1 2 Mar 1980 
(2 Mar 1980) 
 
1 year 
art. 53c, 1 GPR 
 
Aargau 
(30 Mar 2004) 
3 000 art. 64, 1 1 Jan 1982 
(28 Sept 1980) 
1 year 
art. 54, 1 GPR 
 
Thurgau 
(22 Oct 2002) 
4 000 art. 26 1 Jan 1990 
(04 Dec 1988) 
6 months 
Tessin 
(30 Mar 1999) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 1998 
7 000 art. 37 
art. 119, 3 LEDP 
1 Jan 1998 
(14 Dec 1997) 
60 days 
art. 119, 1 LEDP 
Tessin 
(old) 
7 000  art. 59, 4  
art. 56 
1970 
(31 May 1970) 
60 days 
art. 3, 3 LIRR, 1954 
see T/S 1999, p.343 
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Table 3: The statutory initiative 1997 – 2003  (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
Requirement 
Articles in  
cant. const. 
Effective since 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Waadt 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new constitution 
by 1 Sept 2003 
12 000 art. 78 lit. b 
art. 79, 2 
1 Sept 2003 
(22 Sept 2002) 
4 months 
(contradicts LEDP, 
art. 92, 1) 
Waadt 
(old) 
12 000 art. 27, 1 1978 
(4 Dec 1977) 
see T/S 1999, 
p.373 
3 months 
art 92, 1 LEDP 
see also T/S 1999, 
p.373 
Wallis 
(21 Oct 2003) 
4 000 art. 33, 1 1 June 1994 
(24 Oct 1993) 
None 
Neuenburg 
(16 Oct 2001) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2002 
6 000 art. 40, 1 
art. 40, 2 
1 Jan 2002 
(24 Sept 2000) 
6 months 
art. 105, 1 LDP 
Neuenburg  
(alt) 
6 000 art. 38, 2 
art. 38. 3  
1960 
see T/S 1999, 
p.276 
6 months 
art. 105, 1 LDP 
Genf 
(21 Oct 2003) 
10 000 art. 64  
art. 65 B 
 
(art. 65)  
 
(7 Mar 1993) 
4 months  
art. 89, 1 c LEDP 
 
(Einheitsinitiative) 
Jura 
(4 July 2000) 
2 000 art.75,1 1 Jan 1979 
(20 Mar 1977) 
12 months 
Art 89, 1 LDP 
 
Notes: See Table 2. 
 
 
 
3.3 Comments on the changes in constitutional and statutory initiatives  
 
Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the 26 Swiss cantons and their constitutional 
stipulations concerning the constitutional and the statutory initiative between 1997 and 2003. 
In several cantons, alterations in these institutions of direct legislation have occurred since 
1997. In the constitution of Zürich (ZH), the time period available for constitutional and 
statutory initiatives is not fixed (art. 29, 4 cantonal constitution (CC))
35
; instead, it is 
stipulated that a cantonal law should determine this limit. As of the 1st of June, 1969, the time 
period for signature collection was set at 6 months for people's initiatives (art. 13, 2 of the 
Initiativgesetz). On the 1st of September, 2003, a new cantonal law on political rights (Gesetz 
über die politischen Rechte, GPR) was passed in the Kantonsrat that fixed an identical time 
                                                 
35
 Henceforth, CC stands for „cantonal constitution‟. 
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period (art. 126, 1 GPR) and became effective the 1st of January, 2005. In other words, in 
terms of the requirements for statutory and constitutional initiatives, no changes that affect the 
index of direct democracy have been undertaken in Zürich since 1969, despite the enactment 
of a new cantonal law on political rights.  
 
Uri (UR) is one of the cantons in which important changes in the requirements for the 
constitutional and statutory initiatives occurred after 1997. In this canton, the number of 
required signatures doubled from 300 to 600 as of the 1st October, 1997 (art. 28, 2 CC; art. 
27, 1 CC), which caused a duplication of the relative signature requirement from 1.18 per 
voter to 2.36 per voter and, finally, lowered the sub-index for either initiative from 1998 
onwards. Since the identical stipulations are valid for both initiatives, an identical drop is 
noted for the sub-index relating to either types of initiatives (VIR and GIR). The time period 
for collection, however, was not altered by this constitutional revision.  
 
In the canton of Obwalden (OW), on the 29th of November, 1998, the electorate decided 
against maintaining the status of Landsgemeinde. This choice meant that (a) the open vote in a 
yearly citizens' meeting was replaced by a secret vote at the ballot box and (b) the role of the 
representative organ of legislation was strengthened. As regards the constitutional initiative, 
however, no change in institutional requirements occurred after 1968 except for a formal 
renumbering of articles in the constitution. In contrast, as regards the statutory initiative, the 
abolishment of the Landsgemeinde in November 1998 brought about a substantially higher 
signature requirement than before. As a result, the stipulated number of supporters rose from 
1 in June 1997 to 500 in November 1998, which caused a jump in the relative signature hurdle 
from about 0.005 to 2.27. The time period available for collection, however, remained the 
same. In effect, this change led to a substantial decline in the sub-index for the statutory 
initiative (GIR).  
 
For the canton of Nidwalden (NW), there have been no apparent changes in the institutional 
requirements for either initiative since 1996. It might be interesting to point out, however, that 
in addition to the usual initiatives, the citizens can also make a counterproposal to an existing 
decision of the Kantonsrat either to revise the constitution or to make a new/change in 
cantonal law. This institution is very similar to the initiative – in a way it can be viewed as a 
reactive initiative. The requirements for the counterproposals are identical to that for the 
statutory initiative and the constitutional initiative, respectively (see art. 54a, 4 CC).  
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The canton of Glarus (GL) is one of the two cantons in which direct democracy in the form of 
the Landsgemeinde still exists. In this canton every citizen has the right to make a motion to 
the Landsgemeinde, the assembly of its citizens, on issues that concern the Landsgemeinde 
(art. 58, 1 CC). Hence, according to art. 58, 1 CC and art. 138, 3 CC, it takes one vote to 
launch a constitutional or statutory initiative. Art. 69 CC then specifies the fields on which the 
Landsgemeinde can exert its decision-making power, which is comprised of the constitution 
and cantonal laws. Art. 69 CC, however, was amended in May 2002, leading to a seemingly 
indirect restriction of the statutory initiative
36
, because only fundamental regulations should 
be determined in the form of laws, whereas before 2002 any issue could have been in a 
statutory form. The intention of this new regulation was to give the cantonal parliament the 
power to regulate organizational issues, particularly the execution of the federal law, which 
the Swiss federal constitutions stipulates to be carried out in Switzerland by cantonal 
administrations in the form of parliamentary decrees that, as administrative acts, cannot be 
challenged by direct democratic rights
37
. This change in the scope of the statutory initiative, 
however, does not affect the value of the index of direct democracy because no distinction is 
made between a statutory initiative that includes or excludes implementations of federal acts. 
In the same period, the requirements of the constitutional initiative remained unchanged.  
 
In the canton of Freiburg (FR), a new constitution took effect on the 1st of January, 2005. 
Regarding the institutional setup of either the statutory or the constitutional initiative, 
however, no change was introduced. Thus, the index of direct democracy remains unaffected. 
The sole difference to the old legal system is that for both types of initiatives the signature 
requirements are now explicitly stated in the constitution instead of being regulated 
exclusively by a cantonal law. In general, a complete regulation at the constitutional level 
makes the requirements for these initiatives more transparent to the citizenry; it does not, 
however, diminish the power of the electorate to change these requirements through an 
initiative because in Freiburg the requirements for launching a statutory initiative and a 
constitutional one are identical, also before and after 2005. 
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 As well as of the mandatory statutory referendum – see section 4. 
37
 According to Mr. Dürst, Ratsschreiber in the Regierungskanzlei of Glarus, in practice this restriction was only 
carried out to solve an academic battle over whether all executions of federal laws needed to be based on a so-
called cantonal introductory law ('Einführungsgesetz') that would, under the old constitution, have been 
subject to a mandatory referendum. In political practice, he emphasizes, no restriction of direct democratic 
rights was caused by this amendment in May 2002.  
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The people of Schaffhausen (SH) adopted a new constitution that came into force on the 1st of 
January, 2003. This new constitution is one of those total revisions that aimed to modernize 
the structure and wording without changing the legal content – at least as far as the initiatives 
are concerned. In the new constitution, both types of initiatives are now regulated in one 
article (art. 27 CC) rather than being dispersed within the constitution (art. 108, 107 old CC 
and art. 43 old CC). Therefore, no change is observed in the values of the subindices of either 
the constitutional or the statutory initiative.  
 
During the time period under investigation, the people of St. Gallen (SG) also adopted a new 
constitution in 2002, which took effect on the 1st of January, 2003. This new constitution 
brought about decisive changes for the statutory and constitutional initiatives. Specifically, in 
the new constitution, the time for collecting signatures was fixed at 5 months for either 
initiative (for reasons of 'harmonization'
38
), while the number of signatures was raised 
substantially (from 4,000 to 6,000) for the statutory initiative, but maintained at 8,000 for the 
constitutional initiative. Hence, the time requirement has become stricter for the constitutional 
initiative (6 months => 5 months) but more relaxed for the statutory one (3 months => 5 
months). As a consequence, the sub-index for the constitutional initiative (VIR) stayed the 
same
39
, but the sub-index for the statutory initiative (GIR) declined from 4 points down to 
3.66 points. One new feature in this constitution is the introduction of the so-called 
Einheitsinitiative (unitary initiative), which is easier to launch in comparison to a traditional 
statutory or constitutional initiative (4,000 signatures in 5 months, art. 43, 1 CC and art. 45 
CC). The advantages and disadvantages of this kind of initiative have already been described 
in the previous section. As a final change, the minimum time gap between passing a new law 
and starting a new initiative appears to have been erased in the new constitution. Neither the 
unitary initiative nor the change in minimum time gap is reflected in the sub-index for the 
statutory initiative.  
 
Like many other cantonal people, the citizens of Graubünden (GR) also opted for a new 
constitution, which became effective on the 1st of January, 2004, the reason for which it is 
outside the scope of this investigation. The new stipulations brought about a rise in the 
people's empowerment through a decrease in the number of signatures necessary for a 
constitutional initiative (from 5,000 signatures down to 4,000). This development should be 
well reflected in a higher value of the sub-index of the constitutional initiative (from 4.333 up 
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 See Protocol 1 and Protocol 2. 
39
 As the index is constructed, both 180 and 150 days of time for collection fall in the same category. 
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to 4.666). Regarding the statutory initiative, however, the old requirements remained 
unchanged at 3,000. For both initiatives, the time for collecting signatures is set at one year in 
a cantonal law (art. 53c, 1 GPR), which has remained unaltered since 1962. 
 
Also counted among the new cantonal constitutions has to be that of the Italian-speaking 
canton of Tessin (TI), which was adopted in December 1997 and became effective on the 1st 
of January, 1998. Regarding both constitutional and statutory initiatives, no changes are 
observable in the constitutional stipulations. The sole observed change is that the time period 
available for collection is now regulated at the constitutional level and not (exclusively) 
through a cantonal law (art. 3, 3 LIRR for the old constitution; art. 137, 1 LEDP since 1 Jan, 
1999). Hence, the index of direct democracy is unaffected. As the number of signatures for 
launching a constitutional initiative is significantly higher than the number necessary for a 
statutory one (10,000 vs. 7,000), it is now more difficult for the people to induce a change in 
the requirement of the time period for collection than prior to the new constitution. At this 
point, it should be noted that the information given in T/S 1999, p. 343, on the signature 
requirement for the statutory initiative in the proposed constitution does not reflect the 
number actually set in the new constitution.  
 
The canton Waadt (VD) also experienced the introduction of a new constitution, which 
entered into force on the 1st of September, 2003. As in many other cases, however, only small 
institutional changes were introduced through this process. The time period for collecting 
signatures for either initiative was increased from 3 months to 4 months for all initiatives (art. 
79, 2 CC)
40
; however, the number of signatures was augmented to 18,000 for a initiating total 
revision of the constitution but stayed the same for the launching a partial revision and the 
statutory initiative. Since the index of direct democracy does not take into account a total 
revision of the constitution (which occurs less than once in a human lifetime on average), its 
value is not affected by that latter change. Nevertheless, due o the more flexible time limit, the 
sub-indices for either initiative (GIR, VIR) should increase from 2004 onwards. In addition, 
as in many other cantons and in contrast to the old legal setup, the time period for collecting 
signatures is now regulated at the constitutional level. As, however, the requirements for 
changing a cantonal law and amending the constitution are identical in Waadt, regulating such 
                                                 
40
 The new constitutional stipulation contradicts the time limit laid down in the cantonal law on political rights 
(LEDP, art. 92, 1). The Grand Conseil of Waadt, however, amended this law on the 5th of Apr, 2005. This 
revision will come into force after a delay of 40 days if the electorate of Waadt does not carry out a statutory 
referendum to overrule this change.  
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an issue in the constitution does not weaken the institution-setting power of the people. The 
old regulatory setup facilitated, in theory, changes by the parliament to their advantage 
because cantonal laws were then subject only to an optional statutory referendum. The 
cantonal parliament in the past, however, has never abused its power as can be concluded 
from the unchanged stipulation of 3 months signature collection time, having been unchanged 
at least since 1978
41
.  
 
Finally, the people of Neuenburg (NE) also totally revised their old constitution and voted on 
a new one on the 16th of October, 2001, which took effect on the 1st of January, 2002. In the 
new constitution, the stipulations are more transparently and logically structured, but this did 
not cause any change in the institutional setup for either initiative. Therefore, the two 
subindices of the statutory and the constitutional initiatives remain unchanged. Additionally in 
this case, the requirement of the time period, originally solely regulated in the cantonal law 
LDP, became part of the constitutional provisions. Given that signature and time limit 
requirements are identical for both types of initiatives, and also prior and after the 
constitutional change, the electorate‟s influence on the institutional framework remained 
unaffected.  
 
 
4 The statutory referendum 
 
 
Tables 4 and 5 describe the legal status quo and recent amendments concerning the mandatory 
and optional statutory referenda, referring either to laws, decrees, or by-laws, as they 
influence the degree of direct democracy in a canton as measured by the sub-index of the 
statutory referendum (GRR). For reasons of completeness, I have also included information 
on the extraordinary statutory referendum. Not reported are referenda referring to 
international or intercantonal treaties or on special issues. To understand the impact of these 
requirements on the composite index of direct democracy, it must be recalled that in most 
cases, the sub-index of the statutory referendum (GRR) is constructed either (1) based on the 
optional statutory referendum only, in case of non-existence of the mandatory referendum, or, 
(2) as an average of the optional and the (restricted) mandatory statutory referendum; a 
restriction usually pertains to a majority in the legislating organ or the type of laws/by-laws. 
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 See T/S 1999, p. 375 cont. for an account of the institutional development of the initiative. 
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However, if an (unrestricted) mandatory statutory referendum exists, only the latter counts to 
the sub-index. Again, I will only include in the verbal description those cases in which actual 
alterations of the optional statutory referendum between 1997 and 2003 have occurred.  
 
 
4.1 The mandatory statutory referendum  
 
 
Table 4: The mandatory statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 
Canton 
Article in cant. 
const. 
Effective 
since: 
Remarks 
Zürich 
(30 Mar 2004) 
art. 30, num. 1 
 
 
art. 30 bis, 1 
art. 30 bis, 3 
1  Jan 1999 
(27 Sept 1998) 
 
1  Jan 1999 
(27 Sept 1998) 
 
Non-existing for laws  
 
 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
laws and decrees 
Zürich  
(old) 
 
art. 30, num. 1 1869 All formal laws, including those 
treaties which have an impact on the 
cantonal legislation (see T/S 1999, 
p.405) 
Bern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
art. 61, 2 22 Sept 2002 Extraordinary stat. mand. referendum 
on issues which are subject to the 
optional referendum 
Luzern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
art 39, 1 
 
1  Jan 1977 
(5 Dec 1976) 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
laws and concordats 
Uri 
(1. Apr 2003) 
art. 24 lit. b 
 
art. 25, 4 
1 Jan 1985 
(28 Oct 1984) 
All formal laws  
 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
decrees of the Landrat 
Schwyz 
(18 Aug 2004) 
art. 30, 1 
art. 32 
1969 / 1970 All Laws  
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
decrees and by-laws enacted by the 
Kantonsrat 
Obwalden 
(22 Oct 2002) 
 
art. 58 lit. c 
 
art. 59, 2 lit. a 
29 Nov 1998 
(29 Nov 1998) 
Only initiatives which are not 
accepted by the Kantonsrat  
 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
laws 
Obwalden  
(old) 
 
art. 65  
 
 
19 May 1968  All laws were passed in a popular 
vote at the ballot box, 
(Landsgemeinde)
42
. For optional 
referendum, see Table 5  
Nidwalden 
(28 Dec 2001) 
  Non-existing 
                                                 
42
 Personal communication with Mr. Dillier of Rechstdienst of Obwalden, 24 Aug 2004. 
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Table 4: The mandatory statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Article in cant. 
const. 
Effective 
since: 
Remarks 
Glarus 
(30 Mar 2004) 
art. 69, 1 
 
 
 
5  May 2002 
(5 May 2002) 
 
 
Landsgemeinde: only important 
regulations and provisions are passed 
in the form of laws  
 
 
Glarus 
(old) 
 
art. 69, 1 lit. b, 
c 
1 May 1988 
(1 May 1988) 
Landsgemeinde: All laws and 
treaties, including those for 
execution of federal laws 
Zug 
(1 Apr 2003) 
art. 34, 4   
art. 34, 1 
2  Dec 1990 
(2 Dec 1990) 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
laws and decrees of the Kantonsrat  
Freiburg 
(18 Aug 2004) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2005 
 
 1  Jan 2005 
(16 May 2004) 
 
Non-existing 
Freiburg 
(old) 
 
 11 Mar 1921 
(30 Jan1921) 
 
Non existing 
(see also T/S 1999, p. 210) 
 
Solothurn 
(30 Mar 2004) 
 
art. 35 1, lit. c  
 
 
 
art. 35, 2;  
art. 35, 1 lit. k  
11 Dec 1998 
(29 Nov1998) 
 
 
1 Jan 1988 
(1 Jan 1988) 
Laws which have been passed by 
less than 2/3 of the present members 
of the Kantonsrat; 
 
Extraordinary mand, stat. ref. for 
decrees (no change) 
Solothurn  
(old) 
 
art. 35, 1 lit. d 
 
 
art. 35, 2;  
art. 35, 1 lit. k 
1 Jan 1988, 
and before 
1887 
(1 Jan 1988 / 
(8 Jun 1986)) 
All laws  
See T/S 1999, p. 313. 
 
Extraordinary mand. stat ref. for  
decrees of the Kantonsrat 
Basel-Stadt 
(4 July 2000) 
(art. 28, 3) 
 
art. 29, 1 
1890 / 1991 
 
(1978 / 1979) 
(all laws stemming from 
unformulated initiatives) 
Extraordinary mand. stat ref. for  
Basel-Land 
(22 Oct 2002) 
art. 30 lit. a  
 
 
art. 30 lit. b 
1  Jan 2000 
(7 June 1998) 
 
1  Jan 2000 
(7 June 1998) 
Laws passed with less than 4/5 of the 
present members of the Landrat 
 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
laws and nomothetic international 
treaties  
Basel-Land  
(old) 
art. 30 lit. b 
 
1 Jan 1987 
(4 Nov 1984) 
All laws and important decrees 
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Table 4: The mandatory statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Article in cant. 
const. 
Effective 
since: 
Remarks 
Schaffhausen 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2003 
art. 32 lit. c 
 
 
 
 
 
art. 32 lit. e 
 
 
art. 32 lit. i 
 
1 Jan 2003 All Laws which are not subject to an 
optional statutory referendum; i.e. 
those to which less than 4/5 of the 
present members of the Kantonsrat 
have agreed; 
 
Decrees of the Kantonsrat, stipulated 
in a cantonal law 
 
Extraordinary mandatory statutory 
referendum for any decree of the 
Kantonsrat 
Schaffhausen 
(old) 
art. 42, 1 
 
 
 
 
art. 42, 1 num. 
6  
8 June 1980 
 
 
(1895, 1960, 
1977, 1978) 
All laws which are not subject to the 
optional statutory referendum (art. 42 
bis). (see T/S 1999, p.18, p.283) 
Decrees based on art. 23 
 
extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
laws and decrees and possible 
treaties 
(see T/S. 1999, 283-284) 
Appenzell AR 
(3 Apr 2001) 
art. 60, 1 lit. d 
 
 
art. 60, 1 lit. h 
1 June 2000 
(21 May.2000) 
 
1 June 2000 
(21 May 2000) 
Fundamental decrees 
(Grundsatzbeschluss) 
 
Extraordinary mandatory stat. ref. for 
issues subject to the optional stat. ref. 
Appenzell AR 
(28 Sept 1997) 
art. 60, lit b, c 1 May 1996 
(30 Apr 1995) 
Mandatory statutory referendum for 
laws and treaties with law-creating 
character; voting at the ballot box 
Appenzell IR 
(30 Mar 2004) 
 
art. 1, 2 
art. 19, 1,  
art. 20, 1 
27 Apr 1873 
(24 Nov 1872)  
Landsgemeinde  
(i.e. mand. stat. ref. is unrestricted 
and existing) 
St. Gallen 
(9 July 2002) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2003 
art. 49, 1 1 Jan 2003 
(10 June 2001) 
Extraordinary mandatory stat. ref. for  
- laws and nomothetic international 
treaties 
 - on issues subject to the optional 
stat. ref. 
St. Gallen 
(old) 
art. 47, 1 
 
(16 Nov 1890) Extraordinary mand. stat. ref on 
issues subject to the optional stat. ref. 
(T/S 1999; p. 327 cont.) 
Graubünden 
(6 July 2004) 
New constitution 
by 1 Jan 2004 
art. 16, num. 2 
 
 
art. 16, num. 5, 
6 
1 Jan 2004 
(18 May 2003, 
14 Sept 2003) 
Treaties which affect the constitution 
 
 
extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for all 
issues regulated in art. 16 
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Table 4: The mandatory statutory referendum 1997- 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Article in cant. 
const. 
Effective 
since: 
Remarks 
Graubünden 
(old) 
 
art. 2, 2 num. 3 
art 2, 2 num. 4 
art. 2, 2 num.5 
 
 
 
 
 
art. 2, 2 num. 7 
1 Jan 1894 
(2 Oct 1892)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Jan 1894 
(2 Oct 1892)  
Organic laws, laws regarding the 
administration, cantonal laws and 
regulations regarding the execution 
of federal laws; decrees which 
establish new branches of cantonal 
administration 
de facto no exclusion of any law, see 
T/S 1999, p.237 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for any 
other decrees not regulated in art. 2, 
2 
see also T/S 1999, p. 237 cont. 
Aargau 
(30 Mar 2004) 
 
art. 62, 1 B,  
lit. e 
 
 
art. 62, 1 B,  
lit. e 
1 Jan 2003 
(2 June 2002 ) 
 
 
1 Jan 2003 
(2 June 2002 ) 
Laws and decrees subject to an 
optional referendum but not passed 
with absolute majority of the Grosser 
Rat  
Extraordinary mand. stat. referendum 
for the same laws and decrees 
Aargau 
(old) 
 
art.62, b 1 Jan 1982 All Laws 
(as in T/S 1999, p. 124) 
Thurgau 
(22 Oct 2002) 
art. 22 
art. 24, 2 
1 Jan 1990 
(4 Dec 1988) 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref. for 
laws and decrees 
see also T/S 1999, p.347 
Tessin 
(30 Mar 1999) 
new constitution 
by the 1. Jan 
1998 
art. 39 1 Jan 1998 
(14 Dec 1997) 
 
Art 135, 137 LEDP  
Tessin 
(old) 
 
art. 21, 2 29 Oct 1967 
 
Only unformulated statutory 
initiatives 
(see T/S 1999, p.339) 
 
Waadt 
(21 Oct 2003) 
New constitution 
by 1 Sept 2003  
 1 Sept 2003 
 
Non-existing 
Waadt 
(18 Jan 2000) 
 
 29 Nov 1998 
 
Non-existing 
Waadt 
(old) 
 1981 (1885) Non-existing  
(see T/S 1999, p.369 cont.)  
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Table 4: The mandatory statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Article in cant. 
const. 
Effective 
since: 
Remarks 
Wallis 
(21 Oct 2003) 
 
art. 31, 2;  
art. 32, 2 
1 June 1994 
(24 Oct 1993) 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref for 
laws, decrees, and nomothetic 
treaties 
see also T/S 1999. p.384 
Neuenburg 
(16 Oct 2001) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2002 
 1 Jan 2002  
 
Non-existing 
Neuenburg  
(old) 
 
 21 Nov 1858 Non-existing  
(see also T/S 1999, p. 271) 
 
Genf 
(21 Oct 2003) 
 1993 
 
Non-existing 
(see also T/S 1999, p. 230) 
Jura 
(4 July 2000) 
art. 79 1 Jan 1979 
(20 Mar 1977) 
Extraordinary mand. stat. ref for all 
decisions (decrees, laws, etc.) of the 
parliament 
Notes: See Table 2. In some cases the dates of effectiveness were obtained from T/S 1999, 
particularly for Zürich (ZH), Freiburg (FR), Basel-Stadt (BS), St. Gallen (SG), Solothurn 
(SO), Thurgau (TG), Tessin (TI), Waadt (VD) and Genf (GE). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 describes the existence and scope of the mandatory statutory referendum. In many 
cantons, a mandatory statutory referendum exists that is applicable solely to very specific 
laws and contracts but not to all cantonal laws in general. For example, since 1999 in 
Nidwalden (NW), the new mandatory referendum is applicable solely to administrative 
permissions on subterraneous exploitation or storage (art. 52, 6. CC) and in Bern (BE) 
exclusively to intercantonal treaties and alterations in the cantonal demarcations (art. 61, 1 lit. 
c, d). In such cases, the mandatory referendum is treated and regarded as nonexistent for the 
construction of the index of direct democracy because these special cases do not form part of 
the daily political decision-making process. For this reason, I have largely excluded these 
mandatory referenda on treaties and special issues in Table 4. Included, however, are the 
extraordinary statutory referenda because they might shed light on the entire range of 
statutory referenda (jointly with the optional statutory referendum) that exists in a canton. In 
general, however, the analysis in Table 4 addresses all those mandatory statutory referenda 
applicable to all cantonal laws in general. 
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4.2 Comments on the changes in the mandatory statutory referendum 
 
Between 1997 and 2003, a considerable constitutional change regarding the mandatory 
statutory referendum could be observed in Zürich (ZH): the mandatory statutory referendum 
was abolished and an optional statutory referendum was introduced instead. This change 
became effective on the 1st of January, 1999. To evaluate how this change affects the sub-
index for the statutory referendum (GRR), the interplay with the optional statutory 
referendum must be taken into consideration (see section 4.3), causing a drop in the sub-index 
(from 6 to 3.33). On the other hand, in 1999, an additional extraordinary mandatory 
referendum was introduced for laws and decrees (art. 30 bis, 1 and 3 CC). 
 
In canton Bern (BE), a restriction with respect to extraordinary mandatory referendum was 
introduced in September 2002. Prior to this change any law could be subject to such an 
extraordinary referendum if 120 members (out of 200) of the Grosser Rat decided so (see T/S 
1999, p. 177). Now it is stipulated that 100 members (out of 160, art. 72 CC) can put a law or 
decree on the ballot if it is subject to an optional referendum anyway according to art. 62. CC,  
- to which all laws, international treaties, and most decrees are subject. Excepted are specific 
expenditure projects that are below the threshold for an optional fiscal referendum. This 
change, however, did not affect the index of direct democracy because the extraordinary 
mandatory statutory referendum does not form part of it.  
 
In the canton of Obwalden (OW), the abolishment of the Landsgemeinde in 1998 led to a 
dramatic change regarding the mandatory statutory referendum. Traditionally, before the 
popular vote on the 29th of November, 1998, the assembly of the cantonal electorate voted on 
all laws at the ballot box (art. 65 old CC) and by open ballot in case of optional statutory 
referenda on decrees of the Kantonsrat (art. 61 old CC). In the new partial revision of the 
constitution in 1998, this mandatory statutory referendum was eliminated and replaced by an 
optional statutory referendum for laws (art. 59, 1 CC), and the old optional referendum on 
decrees (art. 61, num.1) was completely abolished
43
. According to the revised constitution, a 
statutory initiative must be voted upon by the people if the Kantonsrat does not agree or if it 
makes a counterproposal (art. 58 lit. c CC). According to art. 59, 2 lit. a, an extraordinary 
mandatory statutory referendum can be held if a third of the members of the Kantonsrat 
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 Personal communication with Mr. Dillier of the Rechtsdienst of Obwalden, 24.08.2004 
 34 
agree. This development led to a decline of the sub-index of the statutory referendum (GRR) 
in Obwalden from 6 in 1998 to 4.33 in 1999. 
 
A similar but less drastic revision of the cantonal constitution took place in canton Glarus 
(GL), one of the still existing Landsgemeinden, which, on the surface, appears to have shifted 
power from the direct democratic town meeting to the representative legislative organ 
Landrat on the 5th of May, 2002. The mandatory statutory referendum became restricted to 
only 'fundamental and important regulations and provisions' (art. 69 CC), whereas, as 
implicitly expressed, the remaining legal acts can be determined in the form of decrees and 
by-laws by the Landrat (see also art. 82, 4 CC and 89, lit. b - d CC). In contrast, in the old 
constitution, the Landsgemeinde was responsible for the legislation of all types of laws (art. 
69, 1 lit. b old CC), which also encompassed acts aimed at regulating the execution of federal 
laws. Accordingly, in the new version of article 89 CC, the Landrat is given the power to 
legislate for the execution of both federal and intercantonal law (art. 89, d). Further, it can 
enact decrees if empowered either by the Landsgemeinde or by the constitution (art. 89, lit. b 
and c CC). This development is analogous to that observed for the initiative. In practice, 
however, this partial revision does not play a relevant role in the daily political decision-
making in Glarus and thus, as already discussed in the section on initiatives, does not 
constitute a real restriction of direct legislative power of the electorate.  
 
The people of the canton Freiburg (FR) have passed a new constitution that will come into 
force on the 1st of January, 2005. However, as regards the mandatory statutory referendum, 
no significant change between the old and new constitutions can be observed: in both, it is 
basically nonexistent. 
 
In Solothurn (SO), laws are subject to the mandatory statutory referendum when they have 
been passed by less than a two-thirds majority in parliament. This majority constraint was 
added in the constitutional referendum of the 29th of November, 1998, which became 
effective on the 11th of December, 1998 (see also T/S 1999, p. 312). Hence, since then, a 
mandatory statutory referendum has been taken place more rarely, in contrast to when the 
unrestricted version of this referendum was in force before November 1998. A similar case 
applies to Basel-Land (BL), where the mandatory statutory referendum is applied to cantonal 
laws passed by less then four-fifths of the votes in the cantonal parliament (see also T/S 1999, 
p. 137). This constraint was added through a decision of the Landrat on the 12th of March, 
1998, which became effective on the 1st of January, 2000. In the course of this revision, the 
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extraordinary mandatory statutory referendum was also introduced (art. 30 b CC). In the two 
cases of Solothurn and Basel-Land, the revisions in the cantonal constitutions in 1998 lead to 
a decline in the sub-index value of the statutory referendum (GRR) for both cantons (from 6 
to 5.33 and from 6 to 5.167, respectively).  
 
On the 1st of January, 2003, the new constitution of the canton Schaffhausen (SH) came into 
force, which imposes fewer restrictions on the mandatory statutory referendum than the old 
constitution. As with the old constitution, all laws not subject to an optional statutory 
referendum (art. 32 lit. c CC) must be passed by the cantonal electorate; thus, the mandatory  
referendum also applies to those laws by less than four-fifths of the present members of the 
cantonal parliament („Grosser Rat‟ old CC; „Kantonsrat‟ new CC). In contrast to the new 
constitution, however, the old regulations exempted laws referring to cantonal administration 
and execution of federal laws, as those laws did not bring about new expenses or new taxes 
(art. 42 old CC, T/S 1999, p. 283). In contrast, in the new constitution, the ordinary mandatory 
statutory referendum appears to apply, leaving room also for an applicability in its 
extraordinary form (art 32, 1 lit. h CC; art 33, 1 lit. f CC). This widening of the scope of the 
mandatory statutory referendum in the new constitution, however, does not affect its 
evaluation in the (sub-)index.  
 
Decisive changes after 1997 can also be observed in the case of Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR). 
On the 28th of September, 1997 (effective as of the same date), the annual open 
Landsgemeinde meeting was replaced by secret voting at the ballot box. At that time, 
however, the principle character of the direct democratic institution remained unchanged (and 
thus did not affect the value of the index of direct democracy
44
). On the 21st of May, 2000, 
however, a distinction between the optional and the mandatory statutory referendum was 
introduced that includes the abolishment of the statutory mandatory referendum for both laws 
and international treaties and its replacement by an optional statutory referendum (art. 60 lit. 
b, c old CC, art. 60 bis CC, see also Table 5, effective: 1st June, 2000). Only fundamental 
decrees remained subject to a mandatory statutory referendum (art. 60, 1 lit. d CC). According 
to Mr. Sigrist
45
, this new mandatory referendum on fundamental decrees has been applicable 
only once since its introduction in June 2000 and plays a negligible role. He further stated that 
the laws referring to the execution of such a fundamental decree would, again, be subject to 
                                                 
44
 The index of direct democracy does not take into account the type of voting procedure (e.g. at the ballot box 
vs. by open ballot). 
45
 Personal communication on the 15th of October, 2004.  
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the optional statutory referendum. At this point, it should also be noted that laws triggering a 
new expense are still subject to the mandatory fiscal referendum. 
 
The same constitutional revision in Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR) also affected people‟s 
influence on decrees of the Kantonsrat. The new constitution introduced an extraordinary 
mandatory referendum that can be applied to decrees of the Kantonsrat if a third of its present 
members so demand (art. 60, 1 h CC). This change can be regarded as an improvement in the 
degree of direct democracy (although not one affecting the index) because prior to this last 
revision in 2000, decrees of the Kantonsrat were not subject to any referendum whatsoever 
(see 74, 2 old CC). In sum, through the abolishment of the mandatory statutory referendum, 
however, a decline on the sub-index for the statutory referendum (GRR) was recorded (from 6 
to 4.666). 
 
The people of St. Gallen (SG) adopted a new constitution on the 10th of June, 2001, which 
came into force on the 1st of January, 2003. It brought no changes regarding the non-
existence of the ordinary mandatory statutory referendum, while its extraordinary version 
remained with identical requirements, but couched in revised and more modern wording (if 
demanded by one-third of the members of the cantonal parliament, „Kantonsrat‟ replacing 
„Grosser Rat‟). In both constitutions, the issues that are potentially subject to this type of 
referendum are identical to those potentially subject to an optional statutory referendum (art. 
49, 1 CC; art. 47 old CC, see also T/S 1999, p. 327 cont.). It is readily apparent that these 
minor changes do not affect the index of direct democracy for the canton of St. Gallen. 
 
The abolishment of the mandatory statutory referendum can also be observed in canton 
Graubünden (GR), becoming effective on the 1st of January, 2004. Before this constitutional 
revision, basically all laws, even those only regulating the execution of a federal law, as well 
as decrees that established new branches of administration, were subject to the mandatory 
statutory referendum. In the new constitution, the newly introduced optional statutory 
referendum applies only for laws. In both the old and the new constitution, however, an 
extraordinary mandatory statutory referenda exist. As observed earlier, the abolishment of the 
mandatory statutory referendum for cantonal laws can be expected to cause a decline in the 
index of direct democracy from 2004 onwards. 
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In the canton of Aargau (AG), both the diminishing power of the mandatory statutory 
referendum for laws and its strengthening for decrees can be noted simultaneously. Through a 
popular vote in June 2002, which became effective on the 1st of January, 2003, the 
application of the mandatory referendum for laws was restricted by the new requirement that 
it applies only to those laws not passed by an absolute majority of all members of the Grosser 
Rat (art. 62, 1 b CC). Probably to ease this change, the possibility of an extraordinary 
mandatory referendum was also introduced in the case that a quarter of all members of the 
cantonal parliament demanded it (art. 62, 1 lit. b CC). In the course of this revision, article 62 
was appended a letter „e‟ (art. 62, 1 e CC), which extends the mandatory statutory referendum 
to decrees of the Grosser Rat (according to art. 63, 1 lit. b - d and f CC). This extension 
means that this referendum is now applicable to decrees to which, prior to its revision, only 
the optional statutory referendum applied. The constitutional requirement for the mandatory 
referendum is, again, that decrees have been passed with a majority below the absolute 
majority of the Grosser Rat. Analogous to art. 62, 1 lit. b CC, the extraordinary mandatory 
referendum is also applicable to such decrees. Given that the index of direct democracy 
assigns a higher value to an unrestricted mandatory statutory referendum (old CC) than to a 
combination of restricted mandatory referendum with an optional statutory referendum (new 
CC), a decline in the sub-index GRR is induced by the new majority requirement (from 6 in 
2002 to 5.167 in 2003).  
 
Among the remaining cantons, Tessin (TI), Waadt (VD) and Neuenburg (NE) adopted new 
constitutions in 1998, 2003, and 2002, respectively. These, however, did not bring about any 
changes with respect to the nonexistence of the mandatory statutory referendum for cantonal 
laws.  
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4.3 The optional statutory referendum 
 
 
 
Table 5: The optional statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Articles in cant. 
constitution 
Effective since 
Zürich 
(30 Mar 2004) 
5 000 60 days art. 30 bis, 1 
 
(art. 30 bis, 3) 
(extra. opt. stat. 
ref.) 
1 Jan 1999 
(27. Sept 1998) 
 
(1 Jan 1999) 
Zürich  
(old) 
 
   Mandatory statutory 
referendum  
See table 4 
Bern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
10 000 Three months art. 62, 2 1 Jan 1995 
(6 June 1993) 
Luzern  
(21 Oct 2003) 
3 000 60 days art. 39, 1  
art. 40, 1 
1 Nov 1969 (art. 40, 1) 
1 Jan 1977 (art. 39, 1) 
Uri 
(1 Apr 2003) 
450 
 
90 art. 25, 1  
art. 25, 2 lit. b 
 
1 Oct 1997 
(8 Jun 1997) 
for by-laws;  
mandatory stat. ref. for 
laws see Table 4 
Uri 
(old) 
 
300 90 art 25, 1 Only for by-laws 
(see T/S 1999, p.359) 
(1985) 
mandatory stat. ref. for 
laws see Table 4 
Schwyz 
(18 Aug 
2004)* 
2 000 30 days art. 31, 1 21 Dec 1899  
(23 Oct 1898) 
decrees and by-laws 
mandatory stat. ref. 
see Table 4 
 
Obwalden 
(22 Oct. 2002) 
100 30 days art. 59, 1 lit. a 
art. 59, 2 lit. b 
 29. Nov 1998  
(29.Nov 1998) 
laws 
 
Obwalden 
(old) 
 
 
100 30 days art. 61, no. 1 
art. 73, 1 
Landsgemeinde: 
optional statutory 
referendum for 
decrees of the 
Kantonsrat;  
mandatory stat. ref. 
see table 4 
 
Nidwalden 
(28 Dec 2001)  
250  2 months art 52a, .1 1 Dec 1996  
(1 Dec 1996) 
laws 
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Table 5: The optional statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Articles in cant. 
const. 
Effective since 
Glarus 
(30. Mar 2004) 
1 0 art. 57, 1 lit. b 
art. 58, 1 
1 May 1988 
(1 May 1988) 
Landsgemeinde 
mandatory stat. ref. 
see Table 4 
 
Zug 
(1 Apr 2003) 
1 500 60 days art. 34, 1; 
art. 34, 2 
2 Dec1990  
(2 Dec 1990) 
laws and decrees 
Freiburg 
(18 Aug 
2004)** 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2005) 
6 000 90 art. 46 1 Jan 2005 
(16 May 2004) 
laws 
Freiburg 
(old) 
 
 
6 000 90 days 
see also PRG, 
art. 130, 2 
art. 28 bis, 1 
art. 28 quarter 
11 Mar 1921 
(30 Jan1921) 
laws and decrees 
Solothurn 
(30 Mar 2004) 
1 500 90 days art. 36 1, lit. b 11 Dec 1998 (29.Nov 
1998) 
laws and decrees, 
which are not subject 
to the mand. Stat. ref. 
Solothurn 
(old) 
1 500 90 days art. 36, 1 and 2 1988 – 1998 
By-laws, decrees 
mandatory stat. ref. 
see Table 4 
see T/S 1999, p. 314 
Basel-Stadt 
(4 July 2000) 
2 000 6 weeks art. 29, 1 and 2 21 June 1979 
(24 Sept 1978) 
laws and decrees 
Basel-Land 
(22 Oct 2002) 
1 500 8 weeks art. 31, 1 lit. a  
 
 
art. 31, 1 lit. c  
 
Decrees by the 
Landrat 
(Planungsbeschluss) 
(1 Jan 1987, (4 Nov 
1984)) 
Laws not being 
subject to the mand. 
Stat. ref. (1 Jan 2000, 
(7  Jun 1998)) 
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Table 5: The optional statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Articles in cant. 
const. 
Effective since 
Basel-Land 
(old) 
1 500 8 weeks art. 31, 1 lit. a  
 
 
art. 31, 1 lit. c  
 
Decrees by the 
Landrat (1 Jan 1987, 
(4 Nov 1984)) 
Statutory mand. ref. 
see Table 4 (see T/S 
1999, p. 137 cont.) 
Schaffhausen 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new 
constitution by 
1
st
 Jan 2003 
1 000 90 days art. 33, 1 lit. a 
 
 
 
 
art. 33, 1 lit. b 
All laws to which at 
least 4/5 of the Rat 
have agreed 
Statutory mand. ref. 
see Table 4 
International treaties 
Schaffhausen 
(old) 
 
1 000 90 days art. 42 bis, 1 8 Jun 1980 
laws concerning 
organization of 
administration or 
execution of laws; all 
remaining laws to 
which at least 4/5 of 
the Rat have agreed 
 
 
Appenzell AR 
(3 Apr 2001) 
300 60 days art. 60 bis 1 June 2000 
(21 May 2000) 
laws, treaties with 
law-like character 
Appenzell AR 
(old) 
 
    1 May 1996 
(30 Apr 1995) 
mandatory statutory 
referendum, see table 
4 
Appenzell IR 
(30  Mar 2004) 
 
   27. Apr 1873  
(24 Nov 1872) 
statutory mand. ref., 
see Table 4 
St. Gallen 
(9  July 2002) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2003 
4 000 40 days 
 
art. 49 1 lit. a, b  
art. 50, 1 
1 Jan 2003  
(10  Jun 2001) 
laws and international 
treaties with law-like 
content 
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Table 5: The optional statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Articles in cant. 
const. 
Effective since 
St. Gallen 
(old) 
4 000 30 days art. 47 Laws, general decrees 
not subject to art. 55 
or not of an urgent 
nature  
T/S 1999; p. 327 cont. 
Graubünden 
(6 July 2004) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2004 
1 500 90 art. 17, 1 num. 1 
art. 17, 1 num. 2 
Laws 
International treaties 
with law-affecting 
content 
1 Jan 2004 (18 May 
2003, 14 Sept 2004) 
Graubünden 
(old) 
 
   Non-existing 
1 Jan 1894 (210.1892) 
Statutory mand. ref 
see Table 4 
Aargau 
(30 Mar 2004) 
 
 
3 000 90  
 
art. 63, lit. a 
art. 63, lit. f 
 
 
art. 63, 1 lit. b 
 
 
 
(art. 62, 1 lit. b, 
 lit. e) 
1 Jan 2003  
(2 Jun 2002) 
- laws   
- specific decrees of 
the Grosser Rat which 
are determined by law  
- fundamental plans of 
state activity 
which are all not s.t. a 
mandatory referendum 
(see Table 4) 
art. 40 GPR 
Aargau 
(old) 
 
3 000 90 art. 63, 1 lit. f 
 
 
art. 63, 1 lit. b 
art. 63, 1 lit. a 
 
1 Jan 1982  
Specific decrees of the 
Grosser Rat which are 
determined by law  
Treaties 
Fundamental plans of 
state activity 
art. 40 GPR 
see also T/S 1999, p. 
124 cont. 
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Table 5: The optional statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Articles in cant. 
const. 
Effective since 
Thurgau 
(22 Oct 2002) 
2 000 3 months art. 22 1 Jan 1990 
(4 Dec 1988) 
laws, 
decrees on treaties 
see also T/S 1999, 
p.346 
Tessin 
(30 Mar 1999) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 1998 
7 000 45 days  
 
art. 42 lit. a 
art. 42 lit. c 
1 Jan 1998 
(14 Dec 1997) 
laws and decrees 
treaties with 
nomothetic character 
Tessin 
(old) 
7 000 30 days art. 60, I (31 May 1970) 
laws and decrees 
See T/S 1999, p. 339 
for further application 
Waadt 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Sept 2003 
12 000 40 days art. 84 1, lit. a 
art. 84 1, lit. b 
Laws and decrees  
Treaties with 
nomothetic content 
Waadt 
(old) 
 
12 000 40 days art. 27, 2 1978 / (29 Nov1998)* 
laws and decrees 
see also T/S 1999, 
p.369 
*changes concerning 
fiscal referendum, see 
Tables 6 and 7  
 
Wallis 
(21 Oct 2003) 
 
3 000 90 days art. 31, 1 
 
 
art. 31, 2 
1 June 1994 
(24 Oct1993) 
laws and decrees, 
treaties with 
nomothetic content 
see also T/S 1999, p. 
380 cont. 
Neuenburg 
(16 Oct 2001) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2002 
4 500 40 days art. 42, 1 
 
art. 42 2, lit. a 
art. 42, 2 lit. e 
art. 42, 2 lit. g 
 
 
art. 42, 2 lit. c 
1 Jan 2002  
(24 Sept 2001) 
laws 
treaties 
extraordinary optional 
statutory referendum 
decrees based on 
people's initiatives 
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Table 5: The optional statutory referendum 1997 - 2003 (cont.) 
Canton 
Signature 
requirement 
Time-limit for 
collection 
Articles in cant. 
const. 
Effective since 
Neuenburg  
(old) 
 
6 000 40 days art. 39, 2 
LDP art. 120 
1879, 1959 
(see T/S 1999, p.271) 
Laws and specific 
decrees,  
Genf 
(21 Oct 2003) 
7 000 40 days art. 53 1983 
(7 Mar 1982) 
Laws 
See also T/S 1999, p. 
221-2 
Jura 
(4 July 2000) 
2 000 60 
art. 94 LDP 
art. 78 
art. 78 lit. a 
art. 78 lit. c 
(1 Jan 1979) 
20 Mar 1977 
Laws 
Treaties with 
nomothetic character 
See also T/S 1999, p. 
250 cont. 
Notes: See Table 2. 
 
 
 
4.4 Comments on the changes in the optional statutory referendum 
 
After 1997, many cantons introduced some alterations regarding the optional statutory 
referendum. To begin with, Zürich (ZH) introduced in January 1999 such a referendum as a 
new institution replacing the abolished mandatory statutory referendum. The optional 
referendum is fitted out with the requirement of 5,000 signatures to be collected within 60 
days. As discussed before, in the case of Zürich, this change in the constitution led to a 
decline of the sub-index for the statutory referendum (GRR) from 6, the maximum, down to 
3.33.  
 
In Uri (UR), the optional statutory referendum applies only to by-laws, not to laws. The 
signature requirement for this referendum was raised from 300 to 450 votes in June 1997. In 
this special case, the sub-index of the statutory referendum (GRR) is negatively affected by 
this development. For the treatment of Uri concerning the index of direct democracy, see the 
section 6.  
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The next canton in which a considerable development could be observed is Obwalden (OW). 
In the course of the introduction of a (partly) representative system that became effective in 
1998, an optional statutory referendum for laws was introduced as a new institution with a 
signature requirement of 100 and a collection time of 30 days, simultaneously abolishing the 
old optional referendum for decrees of the Kantonsrat (with the identical requirements). 
According to my source in the Obwalden administration, as a result, decrees can no longer be 
challenged by a referendum
46
. This abolishment of the mandatory statutory referendum has 
led to a lower sub-index value for the statutory referendum (GRR) of just 4.33 compared to 
the previous maximum value achieved in 1998 and 1997.  
 
On the 1st of January, 2005, a new constitution entered into force in the canton of Freiburg 
(FR). This new constitution did not, however, bring about any new stipulations regarding the 
optional statutory referendum (6,000 signatures within 90 days). The only difference lies in 
the fact that the time period for collection is now regulated at the constitutional, not any more 
at the statutory level.  
 
The people of the canton Solothurn (SO) partially revised their constitution in November 
1998. Before 1998, the optional statutory referendum was only applicable to decrees but not 
to laws, to which the mandatory statutory referendum applied (T/S 1999, p. 313 cont.). Now 
the restricting the mandatory statutory referendum in the new constitution, almost all laws and 
decrees of the cantonal parliament can be subject to an optional statutory referendum. The 
signature requirement of 1,500 votes and a time limit for collection of 90 days were kept in 
the amended article. The value of the sub-index for the statutory referendum (GRR) was 
brought down to 5.333 from the maximum value of 6 achieved before.  
 
In Basel-Land (BL), the optional statutory referendum for laws was also introduced as a new 
institution because the use of the mandatory statutory referendum became restricted. The 
number of signatures required was set to 1,500 in a popular vote in 1998, and the time 
available for collection was stipulated as 60 days, identical to the requirements for the old 
optional statutory referendum for decrees, which continues to exist (see T/S 1999, p. 137, for 
the old constitution). The former restriction of the old mandatory statutory referendum caused 
the sub-index for the statutory referendum (GRR) to decline from 6 to 5.167.  
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 Personal communication with Mr. Dillier, 24.08.2004, Rechtsdienst of Obwalden. 
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In Schaffhausen (SH), the new constitution of the 1st of January, 2003, brought about a 
restriction of the optional statutory referendum in comparison to the old constitution: only all 
those laws, including laws concerning administrative issues, to which more than four-fifths of 
the Rat have agreed, are subject to this institution. In the old constitution, however, all laws 
related to administration and organization were subject to only the optional referendum (while 
the remaining laws were subject to the mandatory referendum). The inclusion of 
„administrative‟ laws in the scope of the mandatory statutory referendum led to no change in 
the index of direct democracy.  
 
In the canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR), the electorate decided to introduce an optional 
statutory referendum in 2000, which was not known prior to this date. This optional 
referendum applies to laws and international treaties with a nomothetic impact and can be 
carried out if 300 signatures have been collected within 60 days after the publication of that 
law or treaty. Since this new optional statutory referendum replaces an old mandatory 
referendum, a decline in the level of the sub-index of the statutory referendum (GRR) 
occurred, from 6 down to 4.66.   
 
On January 1st, 2003, a new constitution became effective in the canton St. Gallen (SG). One 
of the prominent differences between the optional statutory referendum of the old and that of 
the new constitution is the time available for the signature collection, which has been 
increased from 30 days to 40 days, while keeping the required number of signatures unaltered. 
The scope of this referendum has been narrowed because, generally, binding decrees of the 
Grosser Rat (now: Kantonsrat) are no longer subject to this referendum (and hence not 
subject to any referendum at all), whereas cantonal laws can still be challenged through this 
referendum (art 49, 1 lit. a CC; art. 47 old CC). In the new constitution, however, regulations 
concerning the wages of civil servants and teachers are explicitly exempted from the optional 
statutory referendum (art. 49, 2 CC). On the other hand, the scope of the optional referendum 
has been widened as international and intercantonal treaties are now subject to it if their 
content is nomothetic (art. 49, 1 lit. b). The increase in the time available for the signature 
collection has caused an increase in the sub-index of the statutory referendum (GRR) from 3 
to 3.33, which is also reflected in the change in the overall index of direct democracy.  
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The electorate of Graubünden (GR) also voted on a new constitution both on the 18th of May 
and the 14th of September, 2003
47
, which took effect on the 1st of January, 2004. Similar to 
the development observable in other cantons, the mandatory statutory referendum was 
replaced by an optional referendum for laws. This new optional statutory referendum is 
applicable to both cantonal laws and treaties whose stipulations are nomothetic. The 
requirement of 1,500 signing supporters out of the electorate must be met within 90 days after 
publication. From 2004 on, this constitutional change will cause the sub-index of the overall 
statutory referendum (GRR) to fall from its old level of 6 points.  
 
Observable in the canton Aargau (AG) is another example where the scope of the optional 
statutory referendum was broadened at the expense of the mandatory statutory referendum. 
On the 2nd of June, 2002, the electorate of Aargau opted for a revision of art. 63, 1 lit. a CC. 
This amendment led to an abolishment of the old unconstrained mandatory referendum by 
including an absolute majority constraint and making 'laws' a new field of application of the 
optional referendum. Additional potential applications of the optional referendum are laid 
down in art. 63, 1 CC (except for lit. e), which also include (among others) decrees of the 
Grosser Rat, as already known in the old constitution. The constitutional requirements for 
taking the optional statutory referendum remained unchanged (3,000 signatures within 90 
days). As the index of direct democracy takes into account statutory referendums for laws 
rather than for decrees, a decline in the level of the overall index of statutory referendum 
(GRR) occurred due to this new restriction (from 6 to 5.167), as discussed in the preceding 
section, which also transmits to the total index (see Table 9 for the overall index change).  
 
The cantonal electorate of Tessin (TI) passed a new constitution effective on the 1st of 
January, 1998, that raised the number of days available for the collection of 7,000 signatures 
from 30 to 45 (art. 42 CC). The optional statutory referendum is applicable to both laws and 
decrees. This change caused an increase in the index for the statutory referendum (GRR) from 
the low level of 1.66  to 2.00 (comparable values are observable for Jura, Geneve, and Vaud).  
 
In the canton of Waadt (VD), a partial revision of the constitution took place in 1998 that, 
however, did not affect the optional statutory referendum for laws (and decrees), only the 
fiscal referendum (see Tables 6 and 7). In 2003, the electorate passed a completely new 
                                                 
47
 Because the official result of the first popular vote on the vote system for electing the Grosser Rat appeared to 
be scanty and changed after a recount in May 2003, it was decided to hold a second popular vote in September 
2003 for reasons of clarification (personal communication with Mr. Frizzoni, September 10, 2004).  
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constitution (effective the 1st of September, 2003)
48
 that extends the application of the 
optional statutory referendum from laws and decrees to international treaties and concordats  - 
in case their stipulations contradict cantonal law or are of a law-giving character in general 
(art. 84 1, lit. b CC). In the old constitution it was not possible for the people to challenge 
these treaties (see T/S 1999, p. 368 cont.). The requirements for taking an optional 
referendum, 12,000 signatures and 40 days, have remained unchanged since 1997, leaving the 
value of the sub-index unaffected.  
 
Finally, in Neuenburg (NE), a new constitution was also adopted in 2001 that entered into 
force as of the 1st of January, 2002. This new constitution brought, first, a change in the scope 
of application of the optional statutory referendum and, second, a facilitation of carrying it 
out. Both in the old and new constitutions the optional statutory referendum is applicable to 
laws, while in the new constitution the specific (general) decrees (art. 39, 2 old CC) are now 
exempted from its application. As regards requirements, the number of signatures was 
lowered from 6,000 down to 4,500, whereas the number of days for collecting them remained 
the same; this new requirement is now entirely regulated in the constitution itself (LDP art. 
120: for the old constitution; art. 42, 1 CC: for the new constitution). New to the scope of the 
optional referendum, however, is its application to international and intercantonal treaties (art. 
42, 2 e CC) that are either nomothetic or equivalent to a decree leading to government 
expenses
49
. Finally, an extraordinary optional statutory referendum was also introduced,  
applicable to “other acts of the Grand Conseil” in the case that 35 of its members so decide 
(art. 42, 2 g CC). The relaxation of the signature requirement in the new constitution has 
caused the sub-index of the statutory referendum (GRR) for Neuenburg to rise, from 1.66 to 
2.33.  
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 The date of effectiveness given in the new constitution (art. 175 CC) was altered through a decree of the 
Grand Conseil of Waadt (2nd of July, 2003). 
49
 For a discussion of the non-applicability of the optional referendum to treaties in the old constitution, see T/S 
1999, p. 272.  
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5  The Fiscal Referendum 
 
The next two tables are devoted to the description of the development of both the mandatory 
and optional fiscal referendum (Tables 6 and 7) on expenditure projects in the Swiss cantons 
between 1997 and 2003.  
 
In general, fiscal referenda refer to resolutions (decrees) of the cantonal parliament that are 
administrative acts (from a legal perspective); in some cantons, the fiscal referendum also 
refers explicitly to specific cantonal laws. For the fiscal referendum to be applicable, these 
decrees and laws have to involve a substantial expense that must be borne by the cantonal 
budget and thus by the cantonal taxpayers. In some constitutions, in which the optional fiscal 
referendum refers solely to expense-triggering decrees of the parliament, it is the (optional) 
statutory referendum that serves as a control device over expenses induced by cantonal law. In 
this sense, the fiscal and the statutory referendum do constitute two institutions whose scope 
of application might partly overlap.  
 
The following Tables 6 and 7 describe only fiscal referenda on expenditure projects (the most 
important type). They do not take into account the existence of either extraordinary fiscal 
referenda or of fiscal referenda related to tax rates, acquisition or disposition of real estate, 
bond loans, and so on, because these latter do not form part of the index of direct democracy. 
For constructing the sub-index for the fiscal referendum (FRR), usually the greater value of 
the points awarded to either the optional or the mandatory referendum is chosen.  
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5.1 The mandatory fiscal referendum 
 
Table 6: The fiscal referendum – mandatory (ordinary) between 1997 and 2003 
Canton 
Financial 
threshold 
Article in 
cant. const. 
effective since Remarks 
Zürich  
(30 Mar 2004) 
  1 Jan 1999 
(27  Sept1998) 
Non-existing 
Zürich 
(old) 
> 20 million  
(> 2 million) 
art. 30 num. 
2  
6 June 1971 Decrees of the 
Kantonsrat 
Bern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
  1 Jan 1995 
(6 June 1993) 
Non-existing 
See T/S 1999, p. 183 
Luzern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
>25 million 
(> 25 millions = 
10 times annual 
expense) 
 
art. 39 bis, 1 
lit. c;  
art. 39, 2 
art. 39 bis, 3 
1 Jan1977 
(5 Dec 1976) 
Decrees and laws of 
the Grosser Rat  
Uri 
(1 Apr 2003) 
> 1 million   
(> 100 000 at 
least 10 years) 
art. 24, lit. c, 
art. 24, lit. d 
1 Jan 1994 
(28 Nov 1993) 
Expenditure 
projects, i.e. decrees; 
laws see Table 4 
Schwyz 
(18 Aug 2004) 
 > 250 000  
(> 50 000 ) 
art. 30, 2 31 Dec 1958 Decrees of the 
Kantonsrat 
See T/S 1999, p.305 
 
Obwalden 
(22 Oct 2002) 
   
 
 
 
 
29 Nov 1998 
(29 Nov1998) 
 
Non-existing 
Obwalden 
(8 June 1997 - 
29. Nov 1998)  
 > 1 million 
(> 200 000) 
 
art.61,  
num. 3 
8 June 1997 
(8 June 1997) 
 
(Landsgemeinde) 
Laws and decrees 
Obwalden 
(old) 
 > 300 000 
( > 50 000) 
 
art.61,  
num. 3  
8 June 1986 
(8  June 1986) 
 
(Landsgemeinde) 
Laws and decrees 
Nidwalden 
(28 Dec 2001) 
> 5 million   
(> 500 000) 
art. 52  
num.4 
1 Dec 1996 
(1 Dec1996) 
Decrees of the 
Landrat  
Glarus 
(30 Mar 2004) 
> 1 million 
(> 200 000) 
 
art. 69, 2 lit. 
b 
5 May 2002 
(5 May 2002) 
(Landsgemeinde) 
Decrees 
 
Glarus 
(old) 
> 500 000 
(> 100 000) 
 
art. 69, 1 lit. 
d 
1 May 1988 
(1 May 1988) 
(Landsgemeinde) 
Decrees  
Zug 
(1 Apr 2003) 
  At least since 
1970 
 
Non-existing 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.401 
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Table 6: The fiscal referendum – mandatory (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Financial 
threshold 
Article in 
cant. const. 
effective since Remarks 
Freiburg 
(18 Aug 2004) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2005 
> 1 %  of the 
overall spending 
of the last 
cantonal budget 
art. 45 lit. b  1 Jan 2005 
(16 May 2004) 
Decrees  and Laws 
of the Grand 
Conseil / Grosser 
Rat 
Freiburg 
(old) 
> 1 %  of the 
overall spending 
of the last 
cantonal budget 
art. 28 bis 7 Oct 1986 
(8 June 1986) 
Laws and decrees of 
the Grosser Rat / 
Grand  Conseil  
Solothurn 
(30 Mar 2004) 
> 5 million  
(> 500 000) 
art. 35, 1 lit. 
e 
11 Dec 1998 
(29 Nov 1998) 
Decrees of the 
Kantonsrat 
Solothurn 
(old) 
> 2 million  
(> 200 000) 
 
art. 35, 1 lit. 
e 
1 Jan 1988 
(8 June 1986) 
(new const.) 
Decrees of the 
Kantonsrat 
See T/S 1999, p.317 
Basel-Stadt 
(4 July 2000) 
  Since 1954 or 
earlier 
Non-existing 
See also  T/S 1999, 
p.161 
Basel-Land 
(22 Oct 2002) 
  1 Jan 1987 and 
before  
Non-existing 
See T/S 1999, p.139 
Schaffhausen 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2003 
3 million 
(> 500 000) 
art. 32 lit. e 1 Jan 2003 
(22 Sept 2002) 
Decrees of the 
Kantonsrat 
Schaffhausen 
(old) 
> 1 million  
(> 100 000) 
 
 > 300 000 < 1 
millions 
(> 50 000 < 100 
000) 
art. 42 ter 
 
 
art. 42, 1 
num. 2 
(23 Apr 1989) 
 
 
(23 Apr 1989) 
Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat 
 
Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat passed 
with less than 4/5 
majority 
(see  T/S 1999, 
p.287) 
Appenzell AR 
(3 Apr 2001) 
> 5% of  a 
taxing unit 
(> 1% of a 
taxing unit)  
 
 
art. 60, 1  
lit. e; art. 76, 
2 lit a, b 
1 May 1996 
(30 Apr 1995) 
(28 Sept 1997: 
abolishment of 
Landsgemeinde); via 
voting at the ballot 
box 
Appenzell AR 
(old) 
> 5% of  a 
taxing unit 
(2003: 
1,650,500) 
(> 1% of a 
taxing unit)  
(2003: 331,000) 
art. 60, 1  
lit. e;  
art. 76, 2  
lit. a, b 
1 May 1996 
(30 Apr 1995) 
(Landsgemeinde) 
Decrees of the 
Kantonsrat 
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Table 6: The fiscal referendum – mandatory (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Financial 
threshold 
Article in 
cant. const. 
effective since Remarks 
Appenzell IR 
(30 Mar 2004) 
> 1 million  
(> 200 000 for at 
least 5 years) 
art. 7 ter, 1 28 Apr 2002 
(28 Apr 2002) 
(Landsgemeinde) 
Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat 
Appenzell IR 
(old) 
> 500 000  
(> 100 000 for at 
least 5 years) 
art. 7 ter, 1 25 Apr 1982 (Landsgemeinde) 
Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat 
St. Gallen 
(9 July 2002) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2003 
> 15 million  
(> 1 500 000 for 
at least 10 years) 
art. 48 lit. d; 
art. 6 RIG 
1 Jan 2003 
(10  June 
2001); 
RIG: IV. NG 
1 Apr 1997 
(11 Apr 1996) 
Laws and decrees; 
threshold specified 
in cantonal law RIG 
 
St. Gallen 
(old) 
> 15 millions  
(> 1 500 000 for 
at least 10 years) 
GS 14, 27; 
nGS 6, 38* 
 
art. 6 RIG 
20  Jan 1924 
(17 Nov 1923) 
 
RIG: IV NG 
1 Apr 1997 
(11 Apr 1996) 
Laws and decrees, 
threshold specified 
in cantonal law RIG 
through last 
amendment IV NG 
see T/S 1999, p.330 
Graubünden 
(6 July 2004) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2004 
> 10 million 
(> 1 million) 
art. 16,  
num. 4 
1 Jan 2004 
(18 May 2003, 
14 Sept 2003) 
Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat 
Graubünden 
(old) 
> 5 million  
(> 500 000 ) 
art. 2, 2  
num. 6 a 
(28 Jan 1973) Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat  
Aargau 
(30. Mar 2004) 
> 5 million 
(> 500 000) 
art. 62, 1  
lit. e 
1 Jan 2003 
(2 June 2002) 
 
Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat if not 
passed with absolute 
majority 
Aargau 
(old) 
  1 Jan 1982 
(28 Sept 1980) 
Non-existing 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.127 
Thurgau 
(22 Oct 2002) 
> 3 million  
(> 600 000 ) 
art. 23, 1 1 Jan 1990 
(4 Dec1988) 
Decrees of the 
Grosser Rat 
Tessin 
(30 Mar 1999) 
new 
constitution by 
the 1 Jan 1998 
  1 Jan 1998 
(14 Dec1997) 
Non-existing 
Also non-existing in 
1997 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.341 
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Table 6: The fiscal referendum – mandatory (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Financial 
threshold 
Article in 
cant. const. 
effective since Remarks 
Waadt 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Sept 2003 
  1 Sept 2003 
(14 Apr 2003) 
Non-existing 
Waadt 
(18 Jan 2000) 
> 20 million  
(> 2 million at 
least for  
10 years ) 
art. 27, 2 bis 29 Nov 1998 
(29 Nov1998) 
 
Decrees of the 
Grand Conseil is 
subject to the 
assembly of the 
communal electorate 
(assemblées de 
commune) 
Waadt 
(old) 
  1885 Non-existing 
See T/S 1999, p.371 
Wallis 
(21 Oct 2003) 
  1 June 1994 
(24 Oct 1993) 
 
Non-existing  
See T/S 1999, p.382 
 
Neuenburg 
(16 Oct 2001) 
new 
constitution by 
1 Jan 2002 
  1 Jan 2002 
(24 Sept2000) 
Non-existing 
Neuenburg  
(old) 
> 1.5 %  
(> 1.5 per mill)  
of total cantonal 
revenues 
art. 39, 3 
 
1992 
(8 Dec 1991) 
Laws and decrees 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.273 
Genf 
(21 Oct 2003) 
   Non-existing 
See also T/S 1999, 
p.223 
Jura 
(4 July 2000) 
> 5% 
(> 5 per mill) 
of the revenues 
of the last budget 
art. 77, lit. d 
art. 77, lit. e  
1 Jan 1979 
(20 Mar 1977) 
laws and decrees, all 
expenses not 
determined by a law  
see also T/S 1999, 
p.253 
Notes: See Table 2. In the column 'Financial threshold', the threshold for recurring expenses is displayed in 
brackets, while the expenditure threshold for nonrecurring expenses is displayed above. All numbers are in 
Swiss Francs.  
* Decree of the Grosser Rat of St. Gallen (SG) (Grossratsbeschluss) of the 17th of November, 1923. 
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5.2 Comments on the changes in the mandatory fiscal referendum 
 
Since 1997, only a few developments regarding the mandatory fiscal referendum (of the 
ordinary type) could be observed. In most of the cantons, the mandatory fiscal referendum 
was either abolished and replaced by an optional fiscal referendum, or its threshold was 
increased substantially. Certainly, such developments might cause a decline in the sub-index 
for the fiscal referendum (FRR). 
 
The most prominent change is probably that which occurred in Zürich (ZH). After years of the 
existence of a mandatory fiscal referendum (from at least 1970 on; see T/S 1999, p. 406), the 
electorate of Zürich decided to abolish it and keep only the optional fiscal referendum. This 
new constitutional amendment became effective on the 1st of January, 1999. An elimination 
of the mandatory fiscal referendum and its replacement by the optional fiscal referendum also 
occurred in Obwalden (OW) (effective: the 29th of November, 1998) after the threshold for 
the mandatory fiscal referendum for laws and decrees had already been increased 
substantially on the 8th of June, 1997, from 300,000 to 1 million Swiss Francs. A similar 
development could also be observed in the canton of Neuenburg (NE), where on the 1st of 
January, 2002, the mandatory fiscal referendum was abolished in the new constitution. Before 
that total revision, the mandatory fiscal referendum existed for nonrecurring expenses of more 
than 1.5% of the last total cantonal revenues (art. 39, 3 old CC). Additionally, in the canton of 
Waadt (VD), an elimination of a previously existing mandatory fiscal referendum took place 
in Apr 2003. The development in this particular canton is described in more detail below. For 
all these cantons, an obvious decline is noticeable in the level of direct democracy. 
 
An increase in the threshold for the mandatory fiscal referendum could be observed in various 
cantons. One of them is Glarus (GL), in which the threshold for decrees was raised from 
500,000 to 1 million Swiss Francs on the 5th of May, 2002. The canton Solothurn (SO) also 
partially revised its requirements for a mandatory fiscal referendum for decrees of the 
Kantonsrat and more than doubled the old financial threshold, from 2,000,000 (valid since 
1988) to 5,000,000 Swiss Francs in 1998. Similarly, the new constitution of the canton of 
Schaffhausen (SH) brought about a tripling of the old threshold for decrees from 1 million to 3 
million Swiss Francs for nonrecurring expenses, from the 1st of January, 2003, onward. At 
this point, it is also worth pointing out that the special mandatory fiscal referendum with a 
substantially lower hurdle of 300,000 Swiss Francs for decrees passed with less than a four-
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fifths majority in the Grosser Rat was not kept in the new constitution. In the canton of 
Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI), on the 28th of April, 2002, the old threshold for decrees was 
doubled to now 1 million Swiss Francs. For their new constitution, the people of the canton of 
Graubünden (GR) approved also new and higher expenditure thresholds for the mandatory 
fiscal referendum (effective as of the 1st of January, 2004): the figure is now 10 million Swiss 
Francs for nonrecurring expenses triggered by decrees of the Grosser Rat – twice as high as 
before the change. In general, increases in thresholds let the sub-index of the mandatory fiscal 
referendum (FRR) decline. 
 
Amendments to the constitution, that, however, that did not lead to an alteration of the legal 
stipulations with respect to the mandatory fiscal referendum also occurred in some cantons 
between 1997 and 2003. One is Freiburg (FR), in which a new constitution entered into force 
on the 1st of January, 2005, which, other than a renumbering of articles, did not affect the 
fiscal referendum. Another example is Appenzell Ausserrhoden (AR) in which, in 1997, the 
Landsgemeinde was abolished without touching the requirements for the mandatory fiscal 
referendum. (The last change concerning the financial hurdle had occurred the year before, on 
the 1st of May, 1996, when it was set at 5% of a taxing unit, equaling 1,650,500 Swiss Francs 
in 2003.) In the canton of St. Gallen (SG), a new constitution also came into force (1st of 
January, 2003) that did not affect the requirements for the mandatory fiscal referendum. The 
financial hurdles for laws and decrees are stipulated in a cantonal law (art. 6 RIG) and since 
1996 the figure has been 15 million Swiss Francs for nonrecurring expenses. From a political 
economy perspective, the regulation of hurdles at the statutory and not at the constitutional 
level is very interesting, as already discussed in the introductory section of this paper on the 
statutory referendum. A new constitution that became effective in the canton of Tessin (TI) on 
the 1st of January, 1998, also led to no alteration with regards to the mandatory fiscal 
referendum. In case legal stipulations do not change, the index of the fiscal referendum is 
unaffected. 
 
In a few cantons, there has been an empowerment of the people through the introduction of a 
mandatory fiscal referendum. One of these cases is the canton of Aargau (AG), in which, after 
years of nonexistence since 1982 (see T/S 1999, p. 341), effective since 1st of January, 2003, 
a mandatory fiscal referendum was introduced again – although its power is mitigated by the 
inclusion of a majority restriction. The evaluation of this restriction was discussed in the 
introductory section of this paper. The new expenditure hurdles are fixed at 5 million Swiss 
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Francs for nonrecurring expenses and at 600,000 Swiss Francs for recurring expenses. 
Similarly, on the 29th of November, 1998, Waadt (VD) also passed a partial revision of its 
constitution, introducing a new fiscal mandatory referendum with a financial threshold of 
20,000,000 Swiss Francs for nonrecurring expenses (art. 27, 2 bis old CC), which had never 
before been known in the history of Waadt (see T/S 1999, p. 368 cont.). It must be noted, 
however, that this mandatory fiscal referendum did not lead to a people‟s vote, but one of the 
assembly of the local communes. In the new constitution (effective: the 1st of September, 
2003), however, this mandatory fiscal referendum was again abolished. Only law-changing 
financial measures by the government to aid a budgetary disequilibrium are now subject to a 
mandatory referendum (art. 83, 2 CC). This regulation seems to aim at restricting raises in 
income tax rates in order to equilibrate expenses and revenue (cf. art. 165, 2 CC). Through 
this stipulation, the electorate of Waadt can influence, at least indirectly, the level of income 
tax rates in times of overall economic hardship.  
 
 
5.3. Optional fiscal referendum 
 
 
Table 7: The fiscal referendum – optional (ordinary) 1997 - 2003 
Canton 
Sign. 
requ. 
Time-limit 
for 
collection 
Financial  
threshold 
Article in cant. const./ 
effective since (date of vote) 
Zürich 
(3 Mar 2004)  
5 000 60 days > 3 million  
(> 300 000)  
art. 28 bis, 1 num. 1, art. 30 
bis 1, 2 
1 Jan 1999 (27 Sept 1998) 
decrees of the Kantonsrat 
Zürich 
(old) 
5 000 45 days > 2 million 
(> 200 000) 
art. 30 num. 2 
1 Jan 1996 (25 Sept 1994) 
Bern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
10 000 3 months 2 million 
(> 400 000)  
art. 62, 1 lit. c  
1 Jan 1995 / (6 Jun 1993) 
and extraordinary optional 
fiscal referendum 
(art. 62, 1 lit. f) (1 Jan 1995) 
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
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Table 7: The fiscal referendum – optional (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Sign. 
requ. 
Time-limit 
for 
collection 
Financial  
threshold 
Article in cant. const./ 
effective since (date of vote) 
Luzern 
(21 Oct 2003) 
3 000  60 days laws:  
> 10 million 
( > 1 million on 
average for 10 
years) 
decrees:   
> 3  million 
( >  300 000 on 
average for 10 
years) 
 
 
art. 39, 2  
1 Jan 1977 (5 Dec 1976) 
art. 39 bis 1 lit. a  
(25 Jun 1995) 
art. 39 bis, 1 lit. b  
(27 Sept 1998) 
(revision only w.r.t. 
extraordinary fisc. ref.) 
art. 40   
1 Nov 1969 (14 Sept 1969) 
art. 39 bis, 3  
1 Nov 1969 (14 Sept 1969) 
laws and decrees of the 
Grosser Rat 
 
Uri 
(1 Apr 2003) 
450 
 
90 days 
 
> 500 000 CHF  
(> 50 000 CHF for 
at least 10 years) 
art. 25, 2, c, d  
1 Jan 1994 (28 Nov1993) 
art. 25, 1  
1 Oct 1997 (8 June 1997) 
art. 25, 3 
1 Jan 1995 (28 Oct 1984)  
" new expenses": laws and 
decrees 
see also T/S 1999, p. 359 
Uri  
(old) 
 
300 90 days 
 
> 500 000 CHF  
(> 50 000 CHF for 
at least 10 years) 
art. 25, 2, lit. c, d  
1 Jan 1994 (28 Nov1993) 
art. 25, 1  
1955 
art. 25, 3 
1 Jan 1995 (28 Oct 1984)  
" new expenses": laws and 
decrees 
see also T/S 1999, p. 359 
Schwyz
50
 
(18 Aug 2004)* 
   non-existing 
stat. ref not applicable to 
decrees of the Kantonsrat, but 
applicable to laws and by-
laws
51
 
See also Tables 4 and 5 
 
                                                 
50
 See the tables in the back of this paper for the calculation of the index value.  
51
 Personal communication with Mr. Gander, Staatsschreiber of Schwyz (SZ). 
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Table 7: The fiscal referendum – optional (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Sign. 
requ. 
Time-limit 
for 
collection 
Financial  
threshold 
Article in cant. const./ 
effective since (date of vote) 
Obwalden 
(22 Oct 2002) 
100  30 days  >  1 million  
(> 200 000) 
(vote at the ballot box) 
art. 59, 1 lit. b 
art. 59, 2 lit. b 
29  Nov 1998 (29  Nov 1998) 
decrees of the Kantonsrat 
Obwalden 
(8  June 1997 – 
29  Nov 1998) 
100 30 days ( > 500 000)  
(> 100 000)  
 
 
(Landsgemeinde) 
art. 61, num. 4 
8 June 1997 (8 June 1997) 
art. 71, 1 
8 June 1997 (8 June 1997) 
decrees of the Kantonsrat 
Obwalden 
(old) 
100 30 days > 100 000 
(> 20 000) 
(Landsgemeinde) 
art. 61, num. 4 
8 June 1986 (8 June 1986) 
decrees of the Kantonsrat 
art. 71, 1 
8 June 1986 (8 June 1986) 
decrees of the Kantonsrat 
 
Nidwalden 
(28 Dec 2001) 
250 2 months > 250 000  
(> 50 000 )  
art. 52 lit. a, 1 
1 Dec 1996 / (1 Dec 1996) 
Glarus 
(30 Mar 2004) 
   no optional fiscal referendum 
mandatory fiscal referendum 
see Table 6 
Zug 
(1 Apr 2003) 
1 500 60 days > 500 000  
(> 50 000)  
art. 34. 1 
art. 34, 2 
2 Dec 1990 (2 Dec 1990) 
laws and general decrees of 
the Kantonsrat 
Freiburg 
(18 Aug 
2004)** 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2005 
6000  90 days > 0.25% of the 
total expenditures 
of the last budget  
(approved account) 
1 Jan 2005 
(16 May 2004) 
art. 46, 1 lit. b 
art. 46, 2 
all acts of the Grand Conseil 
Freiburg 
(old) 
6 000 90 days > 0.25% of the 
total expenditures 
of the last budget 
(approved account) 
art. 28 bis, 3   
7 Oct 1986 (8 June 1986) 
art. 130, 2 PRG 
all laws and decrees 
also applicable: art. 28 ter  
see also T/S 1999, p.211 cont. 
Solothurn 
(30 Mar 2004) 
1 500 90 days > 1 million 
(>100 000)  
art. 36, 1, lit. a 
art. 36, 2 
1 Jan1988 (8 June 1986) 
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Table 7: The fiscal referendum – optional (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Sign. 
Requ. 
Time-limit 
for 
collection 
Financial  
threshold 
Article in cant. const./ 
effective since (date of vote) 
Basel-Stadt 
(4 July 2000) 
(new) 
2 000 6 weeks > 1,5 million 
(or  = sum of all 
annual expenses 
over all years) 
art. 29, 3 lit. c  
21 Jun 1979 (24 Sept 1978) 
see T/S 1999, p.163 
art. 22 
Finanzhaushaltsgesetz   
(1 Jan 1998) 
 
Basel-Stadt 
(old) 
2 000 6 weeks > 1 million 
(> 200 000) 
 
art. 29, 3 lit. c  
21 Jun 1979 (24 Sept 1978) 
see T/S 1999, p.163 
art 1, 1 ArefG  
Basel-Land 
(22 Oct 2002) 
1 500 8 weeks > 500 000  
(> 50 000) 
decrees of the Landrat 
art. 31, 1 lit. b 
art. 31, 1 
art. 31, 3 
1 Jan 1987 
(4 Nov 1984) 
Schaffhausen 
( 21 Oct 2003) 
new constitution 
by 1st  Jan 2003 
1 000 90 days > 1 million  
(> 100 000) 
decrees of the Kantonsrat 
art. 33, 1 lit. d  
art. 33 , 2 
1  Jan 2003 
(17  Jun 2002) 
Schaffhausen 
(old) 
600 60 days > 300 000  
(> 50 000) 
decree of the Grosser Rat if 
4/5  of present members have 
agreed 
art.42ter, 1 
art. 42ter, 2 
(23 Apr 1989) 
Appenzell AR 
(3  Apr 2001) 
  1 May 1996 
(30. Apr 1995) 
non-existing (Landsgemeinde) 
(28 Sept 1997: abolishment of 
the Landsgemeinde and 
replacement of open vote by 
voting at the ballot box) 
Appenzell IR 
(30 Mar 2004) 
200 30 days > 250 000 CHF 
> 50 000 CHF 
art. 7ter, 2  
art. 7ter, 3 
(26 Apr 1992) 
(Landsgemeinde) 
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
St. Gallen 
(9 July 2002) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2003 
4 000 40 days 
 
 > 3 million  
(> 300 000 for at 
least 10 years) 
 
art. 49, 1 lit. c; art. 50, 1  
1 Jan 2003 
(21 June 2001)   
art. 7, 1 RIG: IV NG  
(11 Apr 1996) 
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
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Table 7: The fiscal referendum – optional (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Sign. 
requ. 
Time-limit 
for 
collection 
Financial  
threshold 
Article in cant. const./ 
effective since (date of vote) 
St. Gallen 
(old) 
 
4000  30 days > 3 million  
(> 300 000 for at 
least 10 years) 
 
art. 47  
art. 7, 1 RIG: IV NG  
1 Apr 1997 
(11 Apr 1996) 
higher upper limits through 
mandatory fiscal referendum  
decrees and laws 
 
Graubünden 
(6 July 2004) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2004 
1 500  90 days > 1 million 
(> 300 000)  
art. 17, 1; art. 17, 1 num. 3;  
art. 17, 3 
1 Jan 2004 /(18 May 2003 /  
14 Sept 2003) 
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
change in upper limits through 
mandatory fiscal referendum 
Graubünden 
(old)  
3 000 90 days > 1 million 
(> 300 000)  
art. 2, 2 num. 6 lit. b 
(28 Jan 1973) 
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
Aargau 
(30 Mar 2004) 
3 000 90 > 5 million 
(> 500 000) 
art. 63, 1 lit. d 
art. 63, 1 
1  Jan 2003  
(2  June 2002 )  
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
art. 40 GPR 
(10  Mar 1992) 
Aargau 
(old) 
3 000 90 > 3 Mio  
(> 300 000) 
art. 63, 1 lit. c 
art. 63, 1 
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
1 Jan 1982 / (28 Sept 1980) 
art. 40 GPR 
Thurgau 
(22 Oct 2002) 
2 000 3 months > 1 million 
(> 200 000) 
art. 23, 2 
1 Jan 1990 (4 Dec 1988) 
decrees of the Grosser Rat 
Tessin 
(30 Mar 1999) 
new constitution 
by the 1 Jan 
1998 
7 000 45 days > 1 million 
(> 250 000  for at 
least four years) 
art. 42 lit. b 
1 Jan 1998 / (14 Dec 1997 ) 
decrees and laws (“gli atti”) 
Tessin 
(old) 
7 000 1 month > 200 000 
(> 50 000 for at 
least 4 years) 
art. 60, 2  
(31 May 1970) 
see also T/S 1999, p. 338 cont. 
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Table 7: The fiscal referendum – optional (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Sign. 
requ. 
Time-
limit for 
collection 
Financial  
threshold 
Article in cant. const./ 
effective since (date of vote) 
Waadt 
(21 Oct 2003) 
new constitution 
by 1 Sept 2003 
 
12 000 40 days No threshold art. 84, 1 lit. a 
art. 84, 2 lit. b 
art. 84, 3 
1 Sept 2003 
(14 Apr 2003) 
optional statutory referendum 
applies to decrees (see also 
Table 5) 
exceptions: art. 84, 2 lit. b 
Waadt 
(18  Jan 2000) 
12 000 40 days  > 2 million 
(> 200 000  for 10 
years ) 
art. 27, num. 2 
29 Nov 1998 
(29 Nov 1998) 
all decrees of the Grand 
Conseil 
  
Waadt 
(old) 
(12 000) (40 days) no threshold optional statutory referendum 
applies (see Table 5) 
see also T/S 1999, p. 369 
art. 27, num. 2 
1978 
Wallis 
(21 Oct 2003) 
3 000 90 days > 0.75%  
(> 0.25 %) 
of the total gross 
expenditure of the 
last administration 
and investment 
account 
decrees, but only for 
extraordinary expenses  
(art. 31, 3 num. 2) 
art. 31, 1 num. 3 
1 June 1994 
(24 Oct 1993) 
  
Neuenburg 
(16 Oct 2001) 
new constitution 
by 1 Jan 2002 
4 500 40 days None 
 
decrees and laws which 
trigger expenses 
art. 42, abs. 2 lit. b 
art. 42, 1 
1 Jan 2002 
(24  Sept 2000) 
Neuenburg (old) 6 000 40 days art. 39, 2 
art. 120 LDP 
> 3 per mill of the 
approved budget 
 
simple decrees which trigger 
a new expense 
Genf 
(21 Oct 2003) 
7 000 40 days > 125 000  
(> 60 000)  
laws 
art. 56 
(2 Febr 1986) 
art. 53 
(7  Mar 1982) 
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Table 7: The fiscal referendum – optional (ordinary) (cont.) 
Canton 
Sign. 
Requ. 
Time-limit 
for 
collection 
Financial  
threshold 
Article in cant. const./ 
effective since (date of vote) 
Jura 
(4 July 2000) 
2 000 60 days  > 5 per mil 
(> 0,5 per mil) 
of the revenue of 
the last budget  
art. 78 lit. b  
all expenses not determined by 
a law 
1 Jan 1979 
(20  Mar 1977) 
art. 94 LDP 
Notes: See Tables 2 and 6. 
 
 
 
5.4 Comments on the changes in the optional fiscal referendum 
 
Most of the constitutional revisions regarding the optional fiscal referendum after 1997 
concern alterations of its signature requirement or its financial threshold. Only in a few 
cantons was an elimination of the mandatory fiscal referendum (see preceding section) 
accompanied by an adaptation/extension of the optional fiscal referendum.  
 
After 1997, a major change regarding the optional fiscal referendum occurred in the canton 
Zürich (ZH) when the mandatory fiscal referendum was abolished at the end of 1998 and only 
a revised version of the optional fiscal referendum remained. In the same partial revision of 
the cantonal constitution, the period allotted to the collection of the signatures was increased 
from 45 to 60 days. The financial threshold was augmented to 3,000,000 CHF in contrast to 
2,000,000 CHF, which prevailed until the end of 1998 (see T/S 1999, p. 408 cont.). From 
1999 on, the value of the sub-index of the fiscal referendum (FRR) reached only 4, lower than 
the value of 5 achieved in 1998 and 1997.  
 
The canton Luzern (LU) also introduced a change with respect to optional fiscal referendum, 
but as this did not relate to any of the requirements that form the basis for the derivation of the 
index, it had no impact on the index value for the optional fiscal referendum. Only with 
respect to the extraordinary optional fiscal referendum did a change occur concerning the 
number of members necessary to call in such an institution (art. 39 bis, 1 lit. b). This 
amendment became necessary because the size of the cantonal parliament had been reduced 
from 170 to 120 seats
52
.  
                                                 
52
 Personal communication with Mr. H. Bachmann, January 21, 2004.  
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The canton Uri (UR) is one of the rare cases in which the index value for the optional fiscal 
referendum remained the same for the period between 1997 and 2001, although a partial 
revision with respect to the requirements did take place. From 1997 to 1998, the number of 
signatures requested was raised from 300 to 450 (see T/S 1999, p. 359), applicable to all 
optional referenda. This revision, however, neither changed the results of evaluation of the 
absolute quantity of signatures nor that of the relative number of signatures, because both 
numbers (still) fall into the identical categories before and after the change.  
 
In the canton Obwalden (OW) the electorate voted successfully for a supersession of the 
Landsgemeinde status on the 8th of June, 1997. An optional fiscal referendum was introduced 
with a signature requirement of 100 voters to be collected within 30 days, and a financial 
threshold of 500,000 CHF for nonrecurring expenses was set. In 1998, this threshold was then 
again doubled to 1,000,000 CHF; the identical development occurred for recurring expenses. 
Hence, the index for the optional fiscal referendum was negatively affected in both 1998 and 
1999. The overall index of fiscal referendum (FRR) therefore reflects the (lower) value of the 
optional fiscal referendum as no mandatory referendum has existed since 1998.  
 
The optional fiscal referendum was also revised in the canton of Tessin (TI) on the 14th of 
December, 1997, which became effective with the new constitution on the 1st of January, 
1998. The number of signatures necessary for such a referendum was kept at 7,000, but the 
time allotted for their collection increased from 30 to 45 days (see also T/S 1999, p. 340). The 
financial threshold was also augmented to 1,000,000 Swiss Francs from the original 200,000 
Swiss Francs (see also T/S 1999, p. 341). This development meant an increase in the value for 
the fiscal referendum from 1997 onwards.  
 
Changes also occurred in Waadt (VD) starting in 1999. This canton (re)introduced the 
optional fiscal referendum as a new institution in its cantonal constitution
53
, with a signature 
requirement of 12,000, 40 days allowed for their collection, and a financial threshold set at 
2,000,000 Swiss Francs. These new characteristics of the optional fiscal referendum allowed 
canton Waadt to achieve an index value of 3 between 1999 and 2001 for the optional fiscal 
referendum. At this point, it should be noted that in canton Waadt before 1999, financial 
expenditure projects were (theoretically) covered by the statutory referendum (see T/S 1999, 
                                                 
53
 An optional fiscal referendum also existed in the constitution of 1961 until 1978 (see T/S 1999, p. 371). 
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p. 371). However, according to my source
54
, because the statutory referendum was never 
applied to financial issues, its potential scope was never fully exploited by the electorate. 
When Stutzer (1999) calculated the index values of direct democracy, however, he counted 
the de iure applicability of the optional statutory referendum toward the index of the fiscal 
referendum. Interestingly, the requirements for this new optional fiscal referendum were 
copied from those for the already existing optional statutory referendum, which shows the 
closeness of these two institutions. However, in contrast to the new stipulation of 1999, the 
optional statutory referendum of the old constitution fixed no financial threshold. Therefore, a 
higher index value is observed for the optional fiscal referendum before 1999. 
 
In October 2003, the people of Waadt (VD) adopted a new constitution that became effective 
on the 1st of September, 2003. Besides the abolishment of the mandatory fiscal referendum 
for expenditure projects, it introduced a „réferendum facultatif ‟ that serves both as a statutory 
referendum (art. 84, 1 a CC) and as fiscal referendum. Exempted from this referendum are the 
cantonal budget, supplementary credits, bonds, bound expenses, and accounting (art. 84, 1 lit. 
b CC)
55
. This stipulation means, then, that unbound (non-budgeted) expenses – i.e. 
expenditure projects and also tax-related issues – can be subject to an optional (fiscal) 
referendum. The advantage of this stipulation, from a direct democratic perspective, is that, as 
in the old constitution before its November 1998 revision, no expenditure threshold exists.   
 
According to the new constitution in Neuenburg (NE), which became effective on the 1st of 
January, 2002, 4,500 voters can demand a referendum on a law or decree that triggers 
expenses within 40 days after its publication. This new optional fiscal referendum applies to 
acts of the Grand Conseil, the cantonal parliament (as in the old constitution, see T/S 1999, p. 
273). On the surface, there appears to be no financial threshold for the optional referendum; 
however, the state organ responsible for making financial decisions on expenses above 
400,000 Swiss Francs is the Grand Conseil (the parliament), whereas for those below this 
threshold the responsibility falls to the Conseil d'Etat (the executive organ). Thus, the optional 
referendum appears only to apply to decrees with expenses above 400,000 Swiss Francs. (For 
laws, the optional statutory referendum applies with the exception of the fields stated in art. 
42, 3 CC, such as budget.) There are, however, some differences with respect to the regulation 
in the old constitution: first, a reduction of the signature requirement has occurred (6,000 to 
4,500); second, in the new constitution, the referendum is applicable to all decrees that meet 
                                                 
54
 Personal communication with Prof. G. Kirchgässner, March 2004. 
55
 This article resembles the regulation of art. 27, num. 2 ter, old CC for the mandatory referendum.  
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the threshold requirement, not only to decrees that trigger a 'new' expense. It must also be 
noted, however, that there existed in the old constitution a mandatory referendum on 
expenditure projects for both laws and decrees that did not survive the recent total revision of 
the constitution. For more details of how the system of financial referenda worked under the 
ancient rule in Neuenburg, see T/S 1999, p. 272 cont.  
 
 
6 Reconstruction of the index between 1997 and 2003 
 
6.1.  Definition of the index of direct democracy 
The index of direct democracy is an unweighted average of four different sub-indices that 
reflect different constitutional settings regarding four institutions of direct legislation: the 
constitutional initiative (VIR), the statutory initiative (GIR), the fiscal referendum (FRR), and 
the statutory referendum (GRR). These four sub-indices are based on an assessment of the 
following requirements: the number of signatures (both absolute and relative), the time period 
for their collection, and, in the case of the fiscal referendum, the financial threshold. Both 
Stutzer (1999) and Stutzer and Frey (2000) describe the construction of this index. The reader 
should note, however, that each article presents a different version of the index. The 
difference lies in the question of whether the expenditure threshold per electorate or per 
residential population is used in constructing the sub-index of the fiscal. In the case of this 
study, the number of signatures per voter and the financial threshold per resident is used to 
reflect the financial burden. According to L.P. Feld, this latter setup was also chosen for the 
construction of the index between 1980 and 1997 carried out by Ch.A. Schaltegger.   
 
 
6.2.  General comments on constructing the index of direct democracy 
Regarding the updating of this index, a few general comments need to be made. The 
constitutional initiative that forms part of the index refers exclusively to the partial revision of 
the constitution (see Stutzer 1999). In many cantons, it is easier to launch a partial revision 
than a total revision of the constitution. Concerning the mandatory and the optional statutory 
referendum, in general, this study only takes into account those referenda referring to all types 
of law, not those referring to by-laws or decrees, passed by the cantonal parliament or the 
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executive. Hence, the loss or gain in citizen power with respect to by-laws should not affect 
the (sub)index of direct democracy for a canton. There are, however, a few exceptions; in 
addition, in most of the cantons, the statutory referendums on laws and on decrees are 
equivalent in their requirements. Concerning the fiscal referendum, only the threshold of 
nonrecurring expenses is taken into account, and changes in thresholds for recurring expenses 
are not reflected in the index of direct democracy (see Stutzer 1999). The index does not 
distinguish whether the expense is a consequence of a law or of a decree; however, in daily 
political practice, expenditure projects induced by an administrative act are more often the 
object of a fiscal referendum. Changes that occur after April 1st in any given year are 
accounted for in the following year; for example, the changes in the constitutions of 
Obwalden (OW) in June 1997 and of Glarus (GL) in May 2002 influence the index of direct 
democracy only from 1998 and 2003 onwards, respectively. As regards the signature 
requirement, a month is counted as corresponding to 30 days, 6 weeks to 45 days, and so on.  
 
 
6.3.  The sub-index for the statutory referendum (GRR) 
Regarding the statutory referendum, 6 index points are awarded to those cantons in which a 
mandatory statutory referendum exists. In the case of an optional referendum, index points are 
awarded based on its requirements (absolute and relative signature requirement, time period 
for collection). The difficulty with this index lies in the question of whether decrees and by-
laws of the cantonal parliament are regarded as 'laws' or as administrative acts, and whether 
they should be included in this index or not. This distinction differs from canton to canton, 
and a decision can only be made according to the legal and political practice. For example, in 
the case of Uri (UR), both the mandatory and the optional referendum exist, although the 
optional referendum concerns only parliamentary by-laws not formal laws. In this case, 
Stutzer (1999), taking into account that both types existed in parallel, decided to calculate the 
average of both referenda (p. 5). In my opinion, it would have been more logical either to 
make a decision based on the importance of the by-laws in Uri or to ignore referenda on by-
laws and decrees in general for all cantons equally. For consistency, I have maintained the 
averaging of both institutions for the case of Uri. In addition, for the canton of Schwyz (SZ), 
the mandatory referendum applies to laws and the optional referendum to by-laws, so here 
again the average of the two referenda is used because some by-laws in particular areas aim at 
substituting for formal laws (Stutzer, 1999, p. 5). Again to maintain consistency, I will also 
follow this approach. In a few cantons (Solothurn (SO), Basel-Land (BL), Schaffhausen (SH), 
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Aargau (AG)), a majority restriction was introduced for the application of the mandatory 
statutory referendum during the period from 1997 to 2003; if this requirement is not met, the 
optional referendum applies. In these cases, I replicate the approach chosen by Stutzer (1999) 
and calculate the average of both types of statutory referenda. As the constitutional change in 
Glarus (GL) led de facto to no restriction of the use and scope of the mandatory statutory 
referendum for cantonal laws, only this institution will be taken into account for the index 
construction. It must be noted that except for these few cases, there usually exists in Swiss 
cantons only one of the two types of statutory referenda referring to cantonal laws, and hence 
a final sub-index value for the statutory referendum is out of the question.  
 
 
6.4.  The sub-index for the fiscal referendum (FRR) 
As regards the fiscal referendum, both the optional and the mandatory referenda are awarded 
index points separately, and an index value is calculated for each. The higher value of the two 
is then chosen, which constitutes the sub-index of the fiscal referendum (FRR). In general, no 
distinction is made as to whether the fiscal referendum applies to a law or to a decree. For 
most of the cantons, the threshold for expenditure projects induced by laws or decrees is 
identical. Only the canton of Luzern (LU) makes an exception: here, the considerably lower 
financial threshold for decrees is employed as done in Stutzer (1999). These thresholds have 
remained unchanged since 1995. In the canton of Schaffhausen (SH), the fiscal referenda 
apply solely to decrees, not to laws; hence, the value of the sub-index is based exclusively 
upon these constitutional stipulations. In the old constitution prior to January 2003, a lower 
threshold for the mandatory fiscal referendum was fixed when a decree was passed with less 
than a four-fifths majority. Stutzer (1999) did not take this specific regulation into account, 
probably because it did not apply often in practice. Consequently, in the new constitution of 
Schaffhausen, this particular regulation was dropped, and no majority requirement any longer 
applies to any fiscal referendum.  
 
In the canton of Aargau (AG), a mandatory fiscal referendum was introduced in January 2003 
after a time of non-existence, but accompanied by a majority restriction. This new 
development is taken into account by averaging the index points for the optional and the 
mandatory fiscal referenda, analogously to similar cases for the mandatory statutory 
referendum in other cantons. Regarding the canton of Schwyz (SZ), in which no ordinary 
optional fiscal referendum exists, Stutzer (1999) reports taking into account the optional fiscal 
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referendum for state highways; in this case, the average points of the mandatory and the 
optional fiscal referendum (for state highways) is calculated and used as a fiscal referendum 
sub-index (FRR). Personally, I find this approach inconsistent because other cantons such as 
St. Gallen (SG) have similar optional fiscal referenda on special issues, particularly on 
infrastructure projects; for these cantons, however, this type of optional fiscal referendum is 
not taken into consideration during calculation of the fiscal sub-index. Nevertheless, to keep 
the index consistent over time, I will maintain the special treatment for the canton Schwyz 
(SZ). In 1999, a new cantonal decree on streets (Strassenverordnung) was adopted by the 
Kantonsrat (effective: the 1st of January, 2000), which brought about a higher threshold for 
this optional fiscal referendum (new: art 20, 2 CC) with an expense of more than 20,000,000 
Swiss Francs (prior to change: 2,000,000 Swiss Francs). As regards the signature requirement 
and the time for collection, the regulations have remained unchanged since 1972.  
 
In Stutzer (1999), for the cantons Wallis (VS) and Genf (GE), the requirements for the 
optional fiscal referendum were not taken into account during calculation of the sub-index 
value for the fiscal referendum (FRR) because “only non-budgetary or extraordinary” 
expenses are subject to this referendum. In Stutzer‟s opinion, this omission weakens this 
political institution so considerably that it leads to a de facto nonexistence. Since the 
publication of his calculations in 1999, the constitutional requirements in Wallis have not 
changed (art. 31, 1 num. 3 CC). In art. 31, 1 num. 2 CC, it is explicitly stated that ordinary 
expenses are not subject to an optional (fiscal) referendum. A mandatory fiscal referendum 
exists only in its extraordinary form (since 1994) and hence does not influence the sub-index 
of fiscal referendum (FRR). In the canton of Genf, no constitutional change concerning the 
optional fiscal referendum for expenditure projects occurred between 1997 and 2003, so that 
the reasons for a considerable restriction of its use stated in Stutzer (1999) still apply. Hence, 
in these two cantons Wallis and Genf, the optional fiscal referendum has been awarded an 
index value of 1 as if this referendum were nonexistent.  
 
Interesting also is the case of Waadt (VD). As a very innovative step, this canton introduced a 
mandatory fiscal referendum in 1998. In contrast to the stipulations in the other constitutions, 
this mandatory fiscal referendum could only be used by the assembly of the communes, not 
by its cantonal electorate. I have, however, decided to regard this mandatory referendum as a 
fully valid mandatory referendum as if the electorate had been given the right to vote
56
. Since 
                                                 
56
 Since in this case both mandatory and optional fiscal referenda are awarded identical points for the period in 
question, an averaging over the two institutions as an alternative would have brought about the identical 
 68 
there are about 380 communes in the canton of Waadt, the size of each of them will be so 
small that a single citizen can be assumed to have quite a decisive (indirect) influence on the 
outcome of the mandatory fiscal referendum. In the new constitution of 1 Sept 2003, however, 
this mandatory fiscal referendum was again abolished.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, I must point to the case of Zürich (ZH). Until the end of 1998, 
a mandatory fiscal referendum existed that was then replaced by an optional fiscal 
referendum. The existence of this important institution seems to have been overlooked by 
Trechsel and Serdült in a first unpublished version of a table summarizing the mandatory 
fiscal referenda in Switzerland, on which Stutzer (1999) then based the calculation of the 
index for 1992
57
. As a consecutive fault, the sub-index for the fiscal referendum (FRR) in 
Zürich in Stutzer (1999) is based on incorrect information and is significantly lower then it 
should be (4.00 instead of 5.00). In Stutzer and Frey (2000), however, this mistake has been 
corrected and the index values reported for Zürich are correct.  
 
 
 
7 The development of the index of direct democracy from 1997 to 2003 
 
Table 9 displays the values that the index of direct democracy takes on for the 26 cantons 
during the relevant years, while Tables A2 – A8 in the Appendix report the values for the four 
sub-indices. Table 8 compares three different versions of the index: that published by Stutzer 
(1999) for 1996, that constructed by Feld and Schaltegger for a synthetic panel running from 
1980 to 1998, and, finally, my own calculations for the years 1997 and 1998. I note that in 
T/S 1999, and consequently Stutzer‟s  analysis, the so-called Landsgemeinden (OW, NW, GL, 
AR, AI, see section 1) – i.e. those cantons that knew no representative power of legislation in 
or until shortly prior to 1996 – were excluded from the description of institutions. 
 
A comparison of Stutzer‟s version with that of Feld for 1996 in Table 8 reveals that the value 
of Zürich (ZH), which was correct for 1992 (see e.g. Stutzer and Frey 2000) was perpetuated 
by Feld and maintained until 1998, when at least since 1996, it should have been substantially 
higher (4.417 instead of 4.17). Minor differences can also be observed for the cantons Luzern 
                                                                                                                                                        
points. In addition, taking into account only the optional fiscal referendum would not have changed the value 
of the sub- index for the fiscal referendum (FRR).  
57
 In a personal communication with A. Stutzer, this mistake in Stutzer (1999) was admitted. 
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(LU), Uri (UR), Schwyz (SZ), Schaffhausen (SH), St. Gallen (SG), Graubünden (GR), Tessin 
(TI), Wallis (VS), and Jura (JU). Unfortunately, I was not given access to the calculations by 
which Feld and Schaltegger constructed their version of the index, so the causes for these 
differences cannot be traced. However, the main reason for the differences between their 
index and mine may lie in the fact that, according to a personal communication with Ch.A. 
Schaltegger, they also took into account the so-called recurring expenses in the index for the 
fiscal referendum (FRR). The original sub-index developed by Stutzer (1999) was, however, 
constructed solely on the basis of one-time (i.e. non-recurring) expenditures and neglects the 
thresholds for recurring expenses. The reader should note, however, that in most of the 
cantons, the nonrecurring threshold equals the recurring threshold times the number of years 
in which it reoccurs, so the differences in the index resulting from different evaluation of 
financial thresholds should be influential only in a few cantons. The correlation between the 
three versions of the index of direct democracy, however, exceeds the 90% level so that 
econometric analyses using either version should not produce substantially different results. 
 
Comparing my values for 1997 with the values obtained by Stutzer for 1996, only a few 
differences can be observed. The cantons in question (besides Zürich, ZH) are Freiburg (FR), 
Graubünden (GR), and Jura (JU). First, it should be noted that no new or altered 
constitutional stipulations were observed in these cantons between 1997 and 2003 that could 
affect the index of direct democracy. However, small variations in the index can occur even if 
constitutional revisions are absent: that is, since relative numbers also play a significant role, a 
change either in size of residential population or cantonal electorate can lead to different 
values of institutional sub-indices. In addition, changes are possible when the expenditure 
thresholds are defined as a percentage of some types of cantonal budget, revenues, or 
investments known to vary over the years. In the case of Freiburg (FR), for example, the 
variation in the index is induced by the expenditure threshold for the optional fiscal 
referendum, whereas in the cases of Graubünden (GR), and Jura (JU), it is mainly the change 
in the size of the electorate that makes the relative signature requirement tighter (JU: VIR, 
GIR, GRR, FRR are affected) or looser (GR: VIR is affected)
58
. (Since the index points vary 
across certain brackets and not linearly in the underlying requirement, however, not all minor 
changes in a relative requirement lead automatically to an index change.) 
                                                 
58
 All other requirements remained unaffected.  
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Table 8: Comparison of Index Values of Direct Democracy 
Canton 
(1996) 
Stutzer 
(1996) 
Feld 
(1997) 
Feld 
(1997) 
Fischer 
(1998) 
Feld 
(1998) 
Fischer 
ZH 4.17 4.167 4.167 4.417 4.167 4.417 
BE 3.02 3.021 3.021 3.021 3.021 3.021 
LU 4.42 4.000 4.000 4.417 4.000 4.417 
UR 5.29 5.125 5.125 5.292 5.125 5.125 
SZ 4.99 4.656 4.656 4.990 4.656 4.990 
OW  5.833 5.833 5.833 5.833 5.333 
NW  5.000 5.000 4.438 5.000 4.438 
GL  5.500 5.500 5.750 5.500 5.333 
ZG 4.42 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 
FR 2.85 2.854 2.917 2.854 2.917 2.854 
SO 5.67 5.667 5.667 5.667 5.667 5.667 
BS 4.4 4.396 4.396 4.396 4.396 4.396 
BL 5.69 5.688 5.688 5.688 5.688 5.688 
SH 5.21 5.000 5.000 5.208 5.000 5.208 
AR  5.500 5.500 5.500 5.500 5.500 
AI  5.250 5.250 5.375 5.250 5.375 
SG 3.58 3.167 3.167 3.458 3.167 3.458 
GR 4.75 4.500 4.500 4.833 4.500 4.833 
AG 5.46 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458 
TG 4.33 4.333 4.333 4.333 4.333 4.333 
TI 2.10 1.854 1.854 2.104 1.854 2.250 
VD 2.42 2.417 2.417 2.417 2.417 2.417 
VS 3.58 3.250 3.250 3.583 3.250 3.583 
NE 2.19 2.188 2.250 2.188 2.250 2.188 
GE 1.75 1.750 1.750 1.750 1.750 1.750 
JU 4.02 3.708 3.708 3.708 3.708 3.708 
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Table 9: Overview of the Index of Direct Democracy 1997 - 2003 
Canton 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ZH 4.417 4.417 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 3.500 
BE 3.021 3.021 3.021 3.021 3.021 3.021 3.021 
LU 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 
UR 5.292 5.125 5.125 5.125 5.125 5.125 5.125 
SZ 4.990 4.990 4.990 4.927 4.927 4.927 4.927 
OW 5.833 5.333 4.625 4.625 4.625 4.625 4.625 
NW 4.438 4.438 4.438 4.438 4.438 4.438 4.438 
GL 5.750 5.750 5.750 5.750 5.750 5.750 5.500 
ZG 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.417 4.479 4.479 4.479 
FR 2.854 2.854 2.792 2.792 2.792 2.792 2.792 
SO 5.667 5.667 5.250 5.250 5.250 5.250 5.250 
BS 4.396 4.396 4.396 4.396 4.396 4.396 4.396 
BL 5.688 5.688 5.688 5.479 5.479 5.479 5.479 
SH 5.208 5.208 5.208 5.208 5.208 5.208 5.021 
AR 5.500 5.500 5.500 5.500 5.167 4.917 4.917 
AI 5.375 5.375 5.375 5.438 5.375 5.438 5.438 
SG 3.458 3.458 3.458 3.458 3.458 3.458 3.521 
GR 4.833 4.833 4.833 4.833 4.833 4.833 4.833 
AG 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.458 5.438 
TG 4.333 4.333 4.333 4.333 4.333 4.333 4.333 
TI 2.104 2.250 2.250 2.250 2.250 2.250 2.250 
VD 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500 
VS 3.583 3.583 3.583 3.583 3.583 3.583 3.583 
NE 2.188 2.188 2.188 2.188 2.188 2.729 2.729 
GE 1.750 1.750 1.750 1.750 1.750 1.750 1.750 
JU 3.708 3.708 3.708 3.708 3.708 3.708 3.708 
Source: Own calculations by Justina A: Fischer 
 
 
Finally, I would like to point out that there exists a difference in definition between the index 
constructed in Stutzer (1999) and the one employed in Frey and Stutzer (2000a). Whereas the 
last paper uses the threshold per vote, Stutzer (1999) uses the threshold per capita, which 
includes not only the cantonal electorate but also foreign residents holding a permit of one 
year or longer
59
. The first version of the relative threshold seems to take into account the 
decision-making power of the single citizen with respect to financial matters of the canton, 
while the second versions is based on the view of the threshold as a financial burden shared 
among all residents of the canton. As the studies of Frey and Stutzer also focus on the 
procedural utility gained by Swiss citizens in contrast to foreign residents, the use of the first 
version of this index makes sense in their research context. However, as regards the signature 
requirement, both versions of the index are constructed using the number of signature divided 
                                                 
59
 In some cantons, foreign permanent residents account for up to 20% of the population. It takes 13 years of 
residence to gain Swiss citizenship.  
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by the electorate. Again, the correlation between these two index versions exceeds the value 
of 0.9. 
 
 
8 Brief critique of the index of direct democracy 
 
This paper will conclude with a brief critique of the composite index of direct democracy as 
constructed by Stutzer (1999). The index of direct democracy has many advantages: it 
combines the necessary requirements for utilizing a particular right and makes cantons with 
contrasting institutional equipments comparable. The sole prominent disadvantage is the lack 
of an inflation adjustment: that is, a financial threshold introduced decades ago loses its 
strictness over time, whereas in other cantons a threshold based on an annual budget or some 
of its components not only tends to grow with inflation but also varies with business cycles. 
In practice, however, as can be seen in the case of Freiburg (FR), changes in the threshold 
caused by altering cantonal budget sizes affect the final index of direct democracy only on a 
very small scale. In addition, the missing adjustment of thresholds for inflation has no major 
influence on the value of the index: such an adjustment would only be decisive if it led to a 
switch in the category for evaluation of the relative financial hurdle. If the sub-index value of 
the mandatory fiscal referendum is higher than that for the optional referendum, a switch in 
brackets for the mandatory fiscal referendum causes an alteration of the final index of direct 
democracy by 0.25 index points. In case the value of the optional fiscal referendum is the 
highest, the sub-index for the fiscal referendum (FRR) can switch by 0.25, and the final index 
then by 0.0625 points. In 1997, in 8 cantons, the mandatory fiscal referendum was the 
stronger direct legislative institution. Hence, the majority of the cantons would not be strongly 
affected by an adjustment of threshold for inflation. In addition, a comparison of the index of 
direct democracy over time is only useful for a description of leaps in direct democracy, not 
small changes.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Cantonal Laws Related to Institutions of Direct Democracy 
Canton Law Abbreviation Date of Enactment 
 Gesetz über die politischen 
Rechte 
GPR 1 Sep 2003 
effective: 1 Jan 2005 
ZH (Zürich) Gesetz über das 
Vorschlagsrecht des Volkes 
Initiativgesetz 
(outdated) 
1 Jun 1969 
effective until 1 Jan 2005 
BE (Bern)    
LU (Luzern) Stimmrechtsgesetz SRG 21 Oct 1988 
UR (Uri)    
SZ (Schwyz)    
OW (Obwalden)    
NW (Nidwalden)    
GL (Glarus)    
ZG (Zug)    
FR (Freiburg) Gesetz über die Ausübung 
der politischen Rechte 
PRG 6 Apr 2001 
effective: 1 Aug 2001 
18 Feb 1876 
effective until 1 Aug 2001 
SO (Solothurn)    
BS 
(Basel-City) 
Finanzhaushaltsgesetz Finanzhaushalts-
gesetz  
(16 Apr 1997)  
effective: 1 Jan 1998 
 Gesetz über das 
Ausgabenreferendum 
ArefG 
(outdated) 
(29. June 1978) 
effective until 1 Jan 1998 
BL (Basel-Land)    
SH (Schaffhausen)    
AR (Appenzell Ausserrhoden)   
AI (Appenzell Innerrhoden)   
SG (St. Gallen) Gesetz über Referendum 
und Initiative 
RIG 27 Nov 1967 
effective: 1 Jan 1968 
GR (Graubünden) Gesetz über die Ausübung 
der politischen Rechte 
PRG 7 Oct 1962 
AG 
(Aargau) 
Gesetz über die politischen 
Rechte 
GPR 10 Mar 1992 
TG (Thurgau)    
TI  
(Tessin) 
Legge sull‟esercizio dei 
diritti politici 
LEDP 7 Oct 1998 
effective: 1 Jan 1999 
 Legge sull'iniziativa 
popolare, sul referendum e 
sulla revoca del Consiglio 
di Stato 
LIRR 
(outdated) 
22 Jan 1954 
VD 
(Vaud) 
Lois sur l'exercice des 
droits politiques 
LEDP 16 May 1989 
effective: 1 Jan 1990 
VS (Vallis)    
NE (Neuchatel) Lois sur les droits 
politiques 
LDP 17 Oct 1984 
GE (Geneve) Lois sur l'exercice des 
droits politiques 
LEDP 15 Oct 1982 
JU (Jura) Lois sur les droits 
politiques 
LDP 26 Oct 1978 
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Table A2: Values of Indices of Direct Democracy in 1997 
 
 Index (VIR) Index (GIR) Index (GRR) Index (FRR) Index 
      
Zürich 3.333 3.333 6.000 5.000 4.417 
Bern 2.667 2.667 3.000 3.750 3.021 
Luzern 4.667 5.333 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Uri 5.667 5.667 5.333 4.500 5.292 
Schwyz 5.333 5.333 4.667 4.625 4.990 
Obwalden 5.333 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.833 
Nidwalden 4.000 4.333 4.667 4.750 4.438 
Glarus 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.750 
Zug 5.000 5.000 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Fribourg 3.000 3.000 2.667 2.750 2.854 
Solothurn 5.333 5.333 6.000 6.000 5.667 
Basel-Stadt 4.667 4.667 4.000 4.250 4.396 
Basel-
Landschaft 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.750 5.688 
Schaffhausen 5.333 5.333 5.167 5.000 5.208 
Appenzell A.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.000 5.500 
Appenzell I.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 3.500 5.375 
St.Gallen 3.333 4.000 3.000 3.500 3.458 
Graubünden 4.333 5.000 6.000 4.000 4.833 
Aargau 5.667 5.667 6.000 4.500 5.458 
Thurgau 4.000 4.000 4.333 5.000 4.333 
Ticino 1.333 2.667 1.667 2.750 2.104 
Vaud 2.333 2.333 2.000 3.000 2.417 
Valais 4.333 5.000 4.000 1.000 3.583 
Neuchatel 2.667 2.667 1.667 1.750 2.188 
Geneve 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.750 
Jura 4.667 4.667 3.000 2.500 3.708 
Notes: VIR denotes “Verfassungsinitiativrecht, Constitutional Initiative”, GIR “Gesetzesinitiativrecht, Statutory 
Initiative”, FRR „Fiscal Referendum“, and GRR „Gesetzesreferendum, Statutory Referendum“.   
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Table A3: Values of Indices of Direct Democracy in 1998  
 
 Index (VIR) Index (GIR) Index (GRR) Index (FRR) Index 
      
Zürich 3.333 3.333 6.000 5.000 4.417 
Bern 2.667 2.667 3.000 3.750 3.021 
Luzern 4.667 5.333 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Uri 5.333 5.333 5.333 4.500 5.125 
Schwyz 5.333 5.333 4.667 4.625 4.990 
Obwalden 5.333 6.000 6.000 4.000 5.333 
Nidwalden 4.000 4.333 4.667 4.750 4.438 
Glarus 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.750 
Zug 5.000 5.000 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Fribourg 3.000 3.000 2.667 2.750 2.854 
Solothurn 5.333 5.333 6.000 6.000 5.667 
Basel-Stadt 4.667 4.667 4.000 4.250 4.396 
Basel-Landschaft 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.750 5.688 
Schaffhausen 5.333 5.333 5.167 5.000 5.208 
Appenzell A.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.000 5.500 
Appenzell I.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 3.500 5.375 
St.Gallen 3.333 4.000 3.000 3.500 3.458 
Graubünden 4.333 5.000 6.000 4.000 4.833 
Aargau 5.667 5.667 6.000 4.500 5.458 
Thurgau 4.000 4.000 4.333 5.000 4.333 
Ticino 1.333 2.667 2.000 3.000 2.250 
Vaud 2.333 2.333 2.000 3.000 2.417 
Valais 4.333 5.000 4.000 1.000 3.583 
Neuchatel 2.667 2.667 1.667 1.750 2.188 
Geneve 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.750 
Jura 4.667 4.667 3.000 2.500 3.708 
Notes: VIR denotes “Verfassungsinitiativrecht, Constitutional Initiative”, GIR “Gesetzesinitiativrecht, Statutory 
Initiative”, FRR „Fiscal Referendum“, and GRR „Gesetzesreferendum, Statutory Referendum“.   
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Table A4: Values of Indices of Direct Democracy in 1999 
 
 Index (VIR) Index (GIR) Index (GRR) Index (FRR) Index 
      
Zürich 3.333 3.333 3.333 4.000 3.500 
Bern 2.667 2.667 3.000 3.750 3.021 
Luzern 4.667 5.333 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Uri 5.333 5.333 5.333 4.500 5.125 
Schwyz 5.333 5.333 4.667 4.625 4.990 
Obwalden 5.333 5.333 4.333 3.500 4.625 
Nidwalden 4.000 4.333 4.667 4.750 4.438 
Glarus 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.750 
Zug 5.000 5.000 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Fribourg 3.000 3.000 2.667 2.500 2.792 
Solothurn 5.333 5.333 5.333 5.000 5.250 
Basel-Stadt 4.667 4.667 4.000 4.250 4.396 
Basel-Landschaft 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.750 5.688 
Schaffhausen 5.333 5.333 5.167 5.000 5.208 
Appenzell A.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.000 5.500 
Appenzell I.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 3.500 5.375 
St.Gallen 3.333 4.000 3.000 3.500 3.458 
Graubünden 4.333 5.000 6.000 4.000 4.833 
Aargau 5.667 5.667 6.000 4.500 5.458 
Thurgau 4.000 4.000 4.333 5.000 4.333 
Ticino 1.333 2.667 2.000 3.000 2.250 
Vaud 2.333 2.333 2.000 3.000 2.417 
Valais 4.333 5.000 4.000 1.000 3.583 
Neuchatel 2.667 2.667 1.667 1.750 2.188 
Geneve 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.750 
Jura 4.667 4.667 3.000 2.500 3.708 
Notes: VIR denotes “Verfassungsinitiativrecht, Constitutional Initiative”, GIR “Gesetzesinitiativrecht, Statutory 
Initiative”, FRR „Fiscal Referendum“, and GRR „Gesetzesreferendum, Statutory Referendum“.   
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Table A5: Values of Indices of Direct Democracy in 2000 
 
 Index (VIR) Index (GIR) Index (GRR) Index (FRR) Index 
      
Zürich 3.333 3.333 3.333 4.000 3.500 
Bern 2.667 2.667 3.000 3.750 3.021 
Luzern 4.667 5.333 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Uri 5.333 5.333 5.333 4.500 5.125 
Schwyz 5.333 5.333 4.667 4.375 4.927 
Obwalden 5.333 5.333 4.333 3.500 4.625 
Nidwalden 4.000 4.333 4.667 4.750 4.438 
Glarus 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.750 
Zug 5.000 5.000 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Fribourg 3.000 3.000 2.667 2.500 2.792 
Solothurn 5.333 5.333 5.333 5.000 5.250 
Basel-Stadt 4.667 4.667 4.000 4.250 4.396 
Basel-Landschaft 6.000 6.000 5.167 4.750 5.479 
Schaffhausen 5.333 5.333 5.167 5.000 5.208 
Appenzell A.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.000 5.500 
Appenzell I.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 3.750 5.438 
St.Gallen 3.333 4.000 3.000 3.500 3.458 
Graubünden 4.333 5.000 6.000 4.000 4.833 
Aargau 5.667 5.667 6.000 4.500 5.458 
Thurgau 4.000 4.000 4.333 5.000 4.333 
Ticino 1.333 2.667 2.000 3.000 2.250 
Vaud 2.333 2.333 2.000 3.000 2.417 
Valais 4.333 5.000 4.000 1.000 3.583 
Neuchatel 2.667 2.667 1.667 1.750 2.188 
Geneve 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.750 
Jura 4.667 4.667 3.000 2.500 3.708 
Notes: VIR denotes “Verfassungsinitiativrecht, Constitutional Initiative”, GIR “Gesetzesinitiativrecht, Statutory 
Initiative”, FRR „Fiscal Referendum“, and GRR „Gesetzesreferendum, Statutory Referendum“.   
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Table A6: Values of Indices of Direct Democracy in 2001 
      
 Index (VIR) Index (GIR) Index (GRR) Index (FRR) Index 
      
Zürich 3.333 3.333 3.333 4.000 3.500 
Bern 2.667 2.667 3.000 3.750 3.021 
Luzern 4.667 5.333 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Uri 5.333 5.333 5.333 4.500 5.125 
Schwyz 5.333 5.333 4.667 4.375 4.927 
Obwalden 5.333 5.333 4.333 3.500 4.625 
Nidwalden 4.000 4.333 4.667 4.750 4.438 
Glarus 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.750 
Zug 5.000 5.000 3.667 4.250 4.479 
Fribourg 3.000 3.000 2.667 2.500 2.792 
Solothurn 5.333 5.333 5.333 5.000 5.250 
Basel-Stadt 4.667 4.667 4.000 4.250 4.396 
Basel-Landschaft 6.000 6.000 5.167 4.750 5.479 
Schaffhausen 5.333 5.333 5.167 5.000 5.208 
Appenzell A.Rh. 6.000 6.000 4.667 4.000 5.167 
Appenzell I.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 3.500 5.375 
St.Gallen 3.333 4.000 3.000 3.500 3.458 
Graubünden 4.333 5.000 6.000 4.000 4.833 
Aargau 5.667 5.667 6.000 4.500 5.458 
Thurgau 4.000 4.000 4.333 5.000 4.333 
Ticino 1.333 2.667 2.000 3.000 2.250 
Vaud 2.333 2.333 2.000 3.000 2.417 
Valais 4.333 5.000 4.000 1.000 3.583 
Neuchatel 2.667 2.667 1.667 1.750 2.188 
Geneve 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.750 
Jura 4.667 4.667 3.000 2.500 3.708 
Notes: VIR denotes “Verfassungsinitiativrecht, Constitutional Initiative”, GIR “Gesetzesinitiativrecht, Statutory 
Initiative”, FRR „Fiscal Referendum“, and GRR „Gesetzesreferendum, Statutory Referendum“.   
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Table A7: Values of Indices of Direct Democracy in 2002 
      
 Index (VIR) Index (GIR) Index (GRR) Index (FRR) Index 
      
Zürich 3.333 3.333 3.333 4.000 3.500 
Bern 2.667 2.667 3.000 3.750 3.021 
Luzern 4.667 5.333 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Uri 5.333 5.333 5.333 4.500 5.125 
Schwyz 5.333 5.333 4.667 4.375 4.927 
Obwalden 5.333 5.333 4.333 3.500 4.625 
Nidwalden 4.000 4.333 4.667 4.750 4.438 
Glarus 6.000 6.000 6.000 5.000 5.750 
Zug 5.000 5.000 3.667 4.250 4.479 
Fribourg 3.000 3.000 2.667 2.500 2.792 
Solothurn 5.333 5.333 5.333 5.000 5.250 
Basel-Stadt 4.667 4.667 4.000 4.250 4.396 
Basel-Landschaft 6.000 6.000 5.167 4.750 5.479 
Schaffhausen 5.333 5.333 5.167 5.000 5.208 
Appenzell A.Rh. 6.000 6.000 4.667 3.000 4.917 
Appenzell I.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 3.750 5.438 
St.Gallen 3.333 4.000 3.000 3.500 3.458 
Graubünden 4.333 5.000 6.000 4.000 4.833 
Aargau 5.667 5.667 6.000 4.500 5.458 
Thurgau 4.000 4.000 4.333 5.000 4.333 
Ticino 1.333 2.667 2.000 3.000 2.250 
Vaud 2.333 2.333 2.000 3.000 2.417 
Valais 4.333 5.000 4.000 1.000 3.583 
Neuchatel 2.667 2.667 2.333 3.250 2.729 
Geneve 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.750 
Jura 4.667 4.667 3.000 2.500 3.708 
Notes: VIR denotes “Verfassungsinitiativrecht, Constitutional Initiative”, GIR “Gesetzesinitiativrecht, Statutory 
Initiative”, FRR „Fiscal Referendum“, and GRR „Gesetzesreferendum, Statutory Referendum“.   
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Table A8: Values of Indices of Direct Democracy in 2003 
      
 Index (VIR) Index (GIR) Index (GRR) Index (FRR) Index 
      
Zürich 3.333 3.333 3.333 4.000 3.500 
Bern 2.667 2.667 3.000 3.750 3.021 
Luzern 4.667 5.333 3.667 4.000 4.417 
Uri 5.333 5.333 5.333 4.500 5.125 
Schwyz 5.333 5.333 4.667 4.375 4.927 
Obwalden 5.333 5.333 4.333 3.500 4.625 
Nidwalden 4.000 4.333 4.667 4.750 4.438 
Glarus 6.000 6.000 6.000 4.000 5.500 
Zug 5.000 5.000 3.667 4.250 4.479 
Fribourg 3.000 3.000 2.667 2.500 2.792 
Solothurn 5.333 5.333 5.333 5.000 5.250 
Basel-Stadt 4.667 4.667 4.000 4.250 4.396 
Basel-Landschaft 6.000 6.000 5.167 4.750 5.479 
Schaffhausen 5.333 5.333 5.167 4.250 5.021 
Appenzell A.Rh. 6.000 6.000 4.667 3.000 4.917 
Appenzell I.Rh. 6.000 6.000 6.000 3.750 5.438 
St.Gallen 3.333 3.667 3.333 3.750 3.521 
Graubünden 4.333 5.000 6.000 4.000 4.833 
Aargau 5.667 5.667 5.167 5.250 5.438 
Thurgau 4.000 4.000 4.333 5.000 4.333 
Ticino 1.333 2.667 2.000 3.000 2.250 
Vaud 2.333 2.333 2.000 3.000 2.417 
Valais 4.333 5.000 4.000 1.000 3.583 
Neuchatel 2.667 2.667 2.333 3.250 2.729 
Geneve 2.000 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.750 
Jura 4.667 4.667 3.000 2.500 3.708 
Notes: VIR denotes “Verfassungsinitiativrecht, Constitutional Initiative”, GIR “Gesetzesinitiativrecht, Statutory 
Initiative”, FRR „Fiscal Referendum“, and GRR „Gesetzesreferendum, Statutory Referendum“.   
 
 
